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I 
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES FOR 

UNDERINCLUSIVE STATUTES: A CRITICAL 

APPRAISAL OF HECKLER V. MATHEWS 

Bruce K. Miller* 
Introduction 
The power of the federal courts to remedy injuries caused 
by constitutional violations is a fundamental assumption of our 
constitutional scheme. The Supreme Court's equal protection 
decisions of the past generation illustrate the extent to which 
we take this power completely for granted. When confronted 
with a statute that denies a litigant's fifth or fourteenth amend­
ment right to equal treatment, the Court has rarely limited itself 
to a simple declaration that the statute is unconstitutional. Such 
declarations, rather, have been routinely accompanied by 
awards of often substantial relief to the persons injured by the 
unconstitutional inequality. I 
* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of 
Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1969; A.B., Stanford University, 1966. 
I would like to thank Dean Howard Kalodner and the faculty of Western 
New England College School of Law for their generous support of this article 
through the Law School's Research Grant Program. I am also grateful to John 
Egnal, Leora Harpaz, Art LaFrance and Keith Werhan for their helpful com­
ments on earlier drafts of the article, and especially to Art Wolf, whose 
skepticism about my argument was surpassed only by his commitment to 
helping me try to resolve his doubts. 
See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) 
(sustaining order authorizing enrollment of male applicant in state nursing 
school that had previously admitted only women); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202 (1982) (affirming award directing school district to provide free public 
education to undocumented alien children); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 
199 (1977)(affirming judgment awarding spouses' benefits to male dependents 
of female wage earners previously denied such benefits under Social Security 
Act); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)(affirming judgment 
awarding benefits to male survivors of female wage earners previously denied 
such benefits under Social Security Act); United States Dep't of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (l973)(affirmingjudgment awarding federal food assis­
tance to households containing one or more unrelated persons without regard 
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Brown v. Board of Education2 exemplifies the modem ju­
dicial response to unconstitutional positive law. The Court did 
not just declare that laws which segregated public school stu­
dents by race were unconstitutional; it ordered school systems 
operating under such laws to desegregate "with all deliberate 
speed."3 A decade and a half later, the Court reaffirmed the 
centrality of the grant of relief to the process of constitutional 
adjudication when it upheld a district court order requiring large­
scale busing of pupils in order to achieve desegregation.4 Simi­
larly, in one of its most important public assistance decisions, 
Shapiro v. Thompson,s the Court did not limit its role to de­
claring that durational residency requirements for the welfare 
benefits at issue were an invalid restraint on the right to inter­
state travel; it also ordered payment of benefits to applicants 
whose claims otherwise would have been denied because they 
could not satisfy the unconstitutional residency rules. More 
recently, in Califano v. Goldfarb6 and Jimenez v. Weinberger,7 
Social Security claimants who were denied benefits by statutory 
classifications which discriminated on account of sex or chil­
dren's legitimacy received more from the Court than ajudgrp.ent 
that such classifications were unconstitutional; they also' re­
ceived orders directing payment of the benefits they sought. 
In none of these decisions did the Court discuss, much less 
purport to justify, its authority to remedy constitutional wrongs 
to statutory ban on their eligibility); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 
(l973)(plurality opinion)(granting dependent's benefits to married female Air 
Force officer on same basis as similarly situated male officer); Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)(affirming award of welfare benefits to aliens 
without regard to statutory ban on their eligibility); Swann v. Charlotte-Meck­
lenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)(affirming district court-devised rem­
edies, including busing of pupils, to eliminate unconstitutional public school 
segregation); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)(affirming awards of 
welfare benefits to new residents of states without regard to statutory require­
ment of one year residency before application); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954)(Brown l), 349 U.S. 294 (1955)(Brown Il)(ordering desegrega­
tion of public schools segregated by race). 
2347 U.S. 483 (1954)(Brown l); 349 U.S. 294 (1955)(Brown Il). 
3 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301. 
4 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
6430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
7417 U.S. 628 (1974). 
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as a matter apart from its authority to identify them. This should 
come as no surprise. The Supreme Court, like other American 
courts, derives its authority to declare what the law is from its 
role as an arbiter of concrete disputes.8 This traditional role 
includes the power and, this Article will argue, the responsibility 
to ensure that a party who is wronged receives some form of 
practical relief from that wrong. Since Marbury v. Madison,9 
the Constitution has been thought of as a special species of 
law,lo the Supreme Court's elaboration of which occurs in the 
course of resolution of specific controversies. It is to put the 
controversy to rest, rather than to vindicate constitutional val­
ues, that some kind of relief generally accompanies a judgment 
that a particular statute or practice is unconstitutional. 11 
8 Article III of the Constitution provides in part that "[t]he judicial power 
shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution 
... and to controversies to which the United States shall be a party." U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2. 
9 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
10 ChiefJustice Marshall's justification for judicial review in Marbury rests 
in large part on this proposition. "Certainly, all those who have framed written 
constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and pammount 
law of the nation, and consequently, the theory of every such government 
must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void . 
. . . It is emphatically ... the duty of the judicial department, to say what 
the law is." [d. at 177. In The Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton argued 
that the "constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a 
fundamental law." The Federalist No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton)(Mentor ed. 
1961). For a more contemporary examination of the Constitution as a species 
of law, see generally J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial 
Review (1980); R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 131-49 (1977); Consti­
tutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 259 (1981). 
11 The notion that the purpose of judicial review is to resolve concrete 
disputes rather than to elaborate constitutional values was recently under­
scored by Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Valley Forge Christian 
College v. Americans United for Sepamtion of Church and State, 454 U.S. 
464 (1982). That opinion provides in part: 
To the extent the Court of Appeals relied on a view of standing 
under which Art. III burdens diminish as the "importance" of the 
claim on the merits increases, we reject that notion. The require­
ment of standing "focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint 
before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have 
adjudicated." [citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)] ... [W]e 
know of no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of 
82 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 20 
One notable recent exception, however, has arisen to this 
general tendency to ground the authority to grant constitution­
ally adequate remedies in the judicial function itself. That ex­
ception has grown out of litigation which challenges the consti­
tutionality of a statute on the ground that it is underinclusive. 
Although the most common sources of such litigation are public 
benefits programs containing classifications which are alleged to 
violate the equal protection guarantee,12 the problem of uncon­
stitutional underinclusiveness has also arisen in connection with 
criminal statutes,13 the first amendment prohibition of establish­
ment of religion,14 and state alimony and child support laws. 15 
In all of these areas, upon finding the classification at issue 
unconstitutional, the Court is faced with one of two questions .. 
If the classification has conferred a benefit upon an unconsti­
tutionally favored class, should that benefit be nullified entirely, 
or should it be extended to members of the disfavored class? 
Conversely, if the classification has imposed an unconstitution­
ally underinclusive burden, should that burden be lifted from 
the party asked to bear it, or should it be extended to additional 
classes to ensure that it is applied with constitutionally sufficient 
evenhandedness? 
In cases presenting these questions, the Court has opted, 
often without much discussion, for a remedial choice which 
ensures tangible relief to the litigant before it. 16 In the few 
constitutional values or a complementary "sliding scale" of standing 
which might permit respondents to invoke the judicial power of the 
United States. 
[d. at 484 (footnote omitted). 
12 See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); see also cases cited 
supra note 1; Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Un­
constitutional Legislation, 28 Clev. St. L. Rev. 301, 310-12 (1979). 
13 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 

14 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970)(Harlan, J., concurring 

in result). 
IS Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). 
16 See e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 
413 U.S. 528 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Graham 
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
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decisions in which the Court has discussed its authority to grant 
such relief, however, it has generally explained its remedial 
choices in terms of fealty to legislative purposes rather than as 
an exercise of its own article III remedial powers. 17 This expla­
nation is deficient in at least three respects. First, it does not 
adequately account for the Court's actual remedial choices for 
correcting unconstitutional underinclusiveness. Second, it is in­
capable of principled application in the great majority of cases 
because the legislature has not anticipated the possibility that a 
particular classification may be held unconstitutional and ac­
cordingly has not specified a preferred remedy. In the few cases 
where the legislature has anticipated this possibility, the Court 
may easily identify and adhere to the prescribed remedy. This 
leads, however, to the third, and by far the most important, 
problem: A judicial posture of complete deference to legislative 
remedial choices carries a dangerous potential for immunizing 
unconstitutional classifications from judicial review, thereby un­
dercutting the most important function of the federal courts in 
our constitutional scheme. 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Heckler v. 
Mathews l8 provides disturbing evidence of the immediacy of 
this danger. Mathews concerned a provision of the 1977 Social 
Security amendments which granted to certain dependent 
women an exception from an offset of other retirement benefits 
against Social Security spousal benefits, but denied that excep­
tion to identically situated men. 19 The exception provision was 
accompanied by a remedial clause which directed nullification 
of the exception in the event that the gender classification was 
held unconstitutional. 20 
Justice Brennan's opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court 
not only sustained the classification, but also rejected a chal­
17 Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 88-93 (1979); Welsh v. United States, 
398 U.S. 333, 344-67 (1970)(Harlan, J., concurring in result). But see Iowa­
Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931). 
18 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984). 
19 Social Security Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(4)(A) & 
(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1982). 
20 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1982). 
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lenge to the nullification clause. Mathews argued that the clause 
foreclosed a reviewing court from granting any relief for the 
injury caused him by the allegedly unconstitutional statute. This 
withdrawal of remedial authority, he maintained, amounted to 
an impermissible attempt to curtail federal jurisdiction over his 
constitutional claim by withdrawing his standing to sue. Justice 
Brennan's opinion rejected Mathews' argument at its first prem­
ise. Resting on the Court's previous examinations of the reme­
dial issues posed by unconstitutional underinclusiveness, Justice 
Brennan held that Congress' command that the exception be 
nullified if unconstitutional did not deny Mathews a remedy for 
an unconstitutionally inflicted injury. If the gender classification 
was unconstitutional, its very eradication (whether by extension 
or by nullification of the offset exception) provided a sufficient 
remedy, since such eradication ended the stigmatization and 
stereotyping inherent in sex discrimination.21 
Justice Brennan's analysis of the nullification provision fun­
damentally misapprehended and seriously underestimated the 
importance of the problems it presented. In order to illustrate 
these problems, Part I of this Article will review the approach 
to the extension/nullification problem fashioned by the Court in 
two cases which provide much of the grounding for the Mathews 
opinion: Califano v. Westcott22 and Welsh v. United States.23 
Part II will scrutinize the case of Heckler v. Mathews, which 
demonstrates the inadequacy of the strict adherence to legisla­
tive remedial directions suggested by those cases. Part III will 
offer an alternative account of a reviewing court's responsibili­
ties in cases involving successful claims of unconstitutional un­
derinclusiveness. This alternative account, rooted in the re­
sponsibilities of an article III court, minimizes the danger that 
harms caused by unconstitutional legislation will go unchecked, 
without, as shown in Part IV, undermining the ultimate authority 
of the legislature to effect its own prospective remedy for a 
classification found to be unconstitutionally underinclusive. 
21 Mathews, 104 S. Ct. at 1395. 
22443 U.S. 76 (1979).
23 398 U.S. 333, 344-67 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result). 
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I. The Doctrinal Background of Heckler v. Mathews 
A. Califano v. Westcott 
1. The Remedial Decision 
Califano v. Westcott24 concerned a provision in the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program of the So­
cial Security Act.25 The provision at issue authorized benefits 
to families whose dependent children had been deprived of pa­
rental support because the father was unemployed, but autho­
rized no benefits for identically situated families in which the 
mother was unemployed.26 All nine justices agreed that this sex­
based classification violated the equal protection guarantee of 
the fifth amendment due process clause.27 Only five justices, 
however, voted to extend the "unemployed father" benefits to 
families with unemployed mothers.28 The remaining four justices 
rejected extension on the ground that it amounted to a use of 
the Court's remedial powers "to circumvent the intent of the 
legislature."29 The dissenters would have instead equalized treat­
ment of the two classes of families by nullifying the statutory 
authorization of benefits to families with unemployed fathers. 3D 
This (non)remedy was, in the dissenters' view, the only one 
which was consistent with "the duty and function of the Leg­
islative Branch to review its ... program in light of our decision 
[on the merits] and make such changes therein as it deems 
appropriate."31 
The majority view that the statutory benefits at stake ought 
to be extended rather than extinguished also rested on a per­
ception (albeit very different) of the legislative will.32 It saw 
24 443 U.S. 76 (1979). 
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1982). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1982). 
27 Westcott, 443 U.S. at 83-89,93. 
28 [d. at 93-94. 
29 !d. at 94. 
30 [d. 
31 [d. at 95. 
32 [d. at 89-93. 
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extension as most consistent with "congressional intent to min­
imize the burdens imposed by a declaration of unconstitution­
ality upon innocent recipients of government largesse. "33 Both 
the majority and the dissenters in Westcott thus saw the reme­
dial question as one of statutory interpretation. Neither side 
expressed concern that basic questions of federal judicial au­
thority to resolve cases and controversies or to grant relief to 
litigants aggrieved by unconstitutional legislation might be at 
stake. 
2. 	 The Difficulty of Uncovering Legislative Remedial 
Intent 
The Court's division over the remedy in Westcott may leave 
one wondering which of the two interpretations of legislative 
intent is the better one, and by what standards its superiority is 
to be determined. An examination of the background of the 
classification at issue reveals that such questions are not readily 
answerable, if indeed they are answerable at all. The analytic 
approach suggested by the Court-scrutiny of legislative pur­
pose-lacks practical utility and may serve only to mask other 
motives for its remedial choices. 
The AFDC program from which the Westcott claims arose 
is a jointly financed public assistance program operated by the 
states under federal statutory standards.34 The purpose of the 
program is to provide a minimum income to families with needy 
dependent children.35 From 1935, when the program was estab­
Iished,36 to 1961, a family'S eligibility for AFDC benefits was 
contingent upon the death, absence, or incapacity of a parent 
of either sex;37 a parent's unemployment did not qualify a family 
for benefits. 
Twice during the early 1960's, Congress temporarily ex­
tended AFDC benefits to families whose children were deprived 
33 [d. at 90. 
34 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-03 (1982). 
3S 42 U.S.C. § 601-02 (1982). See also Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 
253 (1974); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316-17 (1968). 
36 Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, Title IV, § 401, 49 Stat. 627. 
37 42 U .S.C. § 606 (1982). 
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of support because a parent was unemployed.38 These temporary 
amendments, like the original eligibility rules, were drafted in 
gender-neutral terms.39 In 1968 this extension of eligibility to 
families impoverished by unemployment was permanently in­
corporated into the Social Security Act.40 At the same time, 
however, Congress introduced the sex classification that even­
tually became the subject of the Westcott litigation. A depen­
dent child, for purposes of AFDC eligibility, included a "needy 
child ... who has been deprived of parental support or care by 
reason of the unemployment ... of his father. "41 
The express purpose of the benefit extension was twofold. 
Most directly the amendment rectified the injustice of "denying 
to the child of the unemployed parent the food that you give to 
the child of the parent who deserts or is absent or dead."42 No 
less important was the goal of curbing the program's structural 
inducement to parental desertion. So long as a family could gain 
eligibility for AFDC benefits if deprived of parental support 
because of the "continuing absence from the home . . . of a 
parent"43 but not because of a parent's unemployment, the ra­
tional solution for an unemployed breadwinner was to desert or 
pretend to desert his family. 
The foregoing use of "his" is, of course, intentional, for 
Congress deliberately elected to withdraw the incentive only 
from unemployed fathers. The gender limitation was part of a 
more general objective of the 1968 amendments to the Social 
Security Act to "tighten standards for eligibility and reduce 
program costS."44 In support of this cost-cutting effort, Congress 
noted that under the temporary amendment enacted during the 
38 Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 1,75 Stat. 75. Act of July 25, 
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, Title I, §§ 104(a)(3), 131(a), 134, 76 Stat. 185, 193, 
196. 
39 Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31 § 1,75 Stat. 75. 
40 Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, Title II, § 203(a), 81 Stat. 882 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1982». 
41 !d. (emphasis supplied). 
42 Hearings on H.R. 3864 and 3865 Before the House Committee on Ways 
and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1961) (statement of Abraham Ribicoff, 
Secretary, HEW). See also Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. at 85-86. 
43 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1982). 
44 Westcott, 443 U.S. at 87. 
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early 1960's, some states had made "families in which the father 
is working but the mother is unemployed eligible for assistance. 
The [1968] bill would not allow such situations. Under the bill 
the program could apply only to the children of unemployed 
fathers. "45 
Congress was plainly concerned with preventing AFDC 
benefits from flowing to families in which the father was present 
and working. Just as plainly, Congress was indifferent to the 
employment status of the mother in families in which the father 
was unemployed. The 1968 amendments did not restrict eligi­
bility for AFDC benefits to families in which the unemployed 
father was also the family's principal wage earner. On the fore­
going evidence, the Supreme Court, when faced with the West­
cott challenge to the gender limitation, unanimously found that 
Congress, 
with an image of the "traditional family" in mind, sim­
ply assumed that the father would be the family bread­
winner, and that the mother's employment role, if any, 
would be secondary. In short, the available evidence 
indicates that the gender distinction was inserted to 
reduce costs and eliminate what was perceived to be a 
type of superfluous eligibility for AFDC-UF [unem­
ployed fathers] benefits.46 
On this basis, the Court found that the classification was not 
substantially related to the goal of reducing a father's incentive 
to desert his family. The Court noted the absence of evidence 
"in the legislative history or elsewhere, that a father has less 
incentive to desert in a family where the mother is the bread­
winner and becomes unemployed than in a family where the 
father is the breadwinner and becomes unemployed. "47 Accord­
ingly, the classification was held to violate the equal protection 
guarantee of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 48 
45 S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1967). See also H.R. Rep. 
No. 554, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1967). 
46 Westcott, 443 U.S. at 88. 
47 [d. 

48 [d. at 89. 
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Congress did not anticipate that its restriction of AFDC 
unemployed parent benefits to families with unemployed fathers 
might be held unconstitutional, and thus offered no direct re­
medial guidance to the Court.49 The legislative history reviewed 
above seems to point with equivalent strength in opposing di­
rections. Not surprisingly, these directions reflect the competing 
purposes which the unconstitutional gender classification was 
intended to serve. On the one hand, the majority was correct in 
viewing the purpose of the AFDC unemployed father program 
as providing "aid to children deprived of basic sustenance be­
cause of a parent's unemployment. "50 It was equally correct in 
noting that nullification of the program "would impose hardship 
on beneficiaries whom Congress plainly meant to protect."51 On 
the other hand, the dissenters were equally persuasive when 
they pointed to the more general cost-cutting purposes of the 
1968 amendments to the AFDC statute. After all, Congress 
made clear its goal of awarding ben~fits only to children of 
unemployed fathers by expressly precluding assistance to fam­
ilies in which the father was working but the mother was not. 52 
The foregoing illustrates the probable futility of searching 
for the enacting legislature'S remedial preference when an un­
derinclusive statute is held unconstitutional. It also suggests that 
49 Congress did, however, place "a strong severability clause" in the Social 
Security Act. !d. at 90 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1303 (originally enacted as Act of 
Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, Title XI, § 1103,49 Stat. 648)). Section 1303 provided 
as follows: "If any provision of this chapter, or the application thereof to any 
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter, and the 
application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be 
affected thereby." 443 U.S. at 90, n.8. 
Although this clause was enacted more than thirty years before the "un­
employed father" provision at issue in Westcott, the Court found that it 
"counsel[ed] against nullification [of the unemployed parent benefit program], 
for it evidences a congressional intent to minimize the burdens imposed by a 
declaration of unconstitutionality upon innocent recipients of government lar­
gesse." 443 U.S. at 90. Under this analysis, the enactment of a clause that 
pointed against saving the remainder of the Act would presumably have 
counseled in favor of nullification. For a discussion of the effects of such a 
clause, see infra text accompanying notes 89-93. 
50 Westcott, 443 U.S. at 85. 
51 [d. at 90. 
52 [d. at 94-95 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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the legislative preference "discovered" by ajudge in such a case 
is likely to be based on little more than her personal assessment 
of the relative worth of social welfare legislation compared to 
the demands for fiscal frugality-in other words, on the partic­
ular judge's political and social philosophy. A court asked to 
divine the remedial intent of a silent legislature cannot expect 
to find reliable moorings. A legislature which has enacted an 
underinclusive classification ultimately found unconstitutional 
has often acted years, and in Westcott more than a decade,53 
before the challenging litigation. If, as in Westcott, the legisla­
ture has enacted no statutory language prescribing a remedy in 
the event of the classification's unconstitutionality, it most likely 
never considered the possibility of invalidation during its delib­
erations on the measure. Under these circumstances, the legis­
lative history will rarely reveal anything helpful in choosing the 
"preferred remedy" years later when a court invalidates the 
classification. 
Justice Powell's dissent in Westcott further suggests that 
previous legislative history may somehow reflect the remedial 
wishes of the legislature sitting at the time the classification is 
before the court for review. 54 This view has been trenchantly 
and quite properly criticized by Dean LaFrance: 
Divining the reasoning of a past legislature-in itself 
no easy task-to predict the mood ofa present or future 
one is simply an exercise in reading political tea leaves. 
In this sense the Westcott dissent was arrogating to 
itself legislative prerogative in presuming to be able to 
divine not only past but present and future legislative 
sentiments.55 
LaFrance accordingly concluded that "legislative intent then 
becomes largely irrelevant except as a possible response to 
'3 The unemployed father provision challenged in Westcott was enacted 
in 1968; the case was decided in 1979. 
'4 Westcott, 443 U.S. at 96. 
55 LaFrance, Problems ofRelief in Equal Protection Cases, 13 Clearing­
house Rev. 438, 440 (1979). But see Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 316 (arguing 
that the probable will of the legislature ought to determine the remedy for 
unconstitutional underinclusiveness). 
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judicial relief not-as the Westcott dissents suggested-as a 
precondition."56 
B. Welsh v. United States 
If an attempt to discover possibly unconsidered remedial 
wishes of a silent legislature is unlikely to bear fruit, it is rea­
sonable to ask why the justices in Westcott unanimously felt 
obliged to conduct such a search. The major source of the 
Westcott Court's approach to the extension/nullification prob­
lem was Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Welsh v. United 
StatesY Justice Harlan's Welsh concurrence contains the 
Court's only reasonably contemporary examination of the issues 
facing a court asked to fashion a remedy for an unconstitution­
ally underinclusive classification. 
Welsh concerned an appeal from the criminal conviction of 
a conscientious objector who refused induction into the military 
on ethical grounds of a secular rather than a religious nature. 58 
The statute authorizing exemption from military service for con­
scientious objectors59 had been construed by Selective Service 
officials to limit objector status to those whose opposition to 
war was grounded in formal religious training and belief. A 
majority of the Supreme Court rejected this construction and 
reversed Welsh's conviction on the statutory ground that the 
exemption encompassed his ethically rooted, but not tradition­
ally religious, scruples.60 
Justice Harlan could not accept the majority's reading of 
the statute and was thus forced to reach the constitutional issue, 
which he resolved by finding that the statutory distinction be­
tween religious and secular beliefs amounted to an establishment 
of religion, in violation of the first amendment. 61 This disposition 
of Welsh's appeal brought Justice Harlan face-to-face with the 
56 LaFrance, supra note 55, at 440. 
57 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970). 
58Id. at 337. 
59 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (Supp. IV 1964); Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336. 
60 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341-43. 
61/d. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). 
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extension/nullification problem. He began the remedial portion 
of his opinion by noting: 
Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion 
there exist two remedial alternatives: a court may ei­
ther declare [the statute] a nullity and order that its 
benefits not extend to the class that the legislature 
intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of 
the statute to include those who are aggrieved by 
exclusion.62 
Justice Harlan then observed that because Welsh's challenge to 
the conscientious objection classification occurred in the context 
of a criminal appeal, a court which agreed with the merit of his 
claim was "mandated by the Constitution" to extend the statu­
tory benefit of conscientious objector status to him.63 This result 
was required because extension was the only basis for reversal 
of Welsh's conviction, and without such a reversal Welsh would 
be required to "go remediless,"64 an outcome not only unsatis­
factory to Welsh but inconsistent with the Court's constitutional 
duty. 
In a lengthy dictum, Justice Harlan explained that this same 
remedial result, extension of conscientious objector status to 
persons opposed to war on secular grounds, would have also 
been the proper approach had the question of the statute's 
constitutionality been presented in a civil action for declaratory 
judgment.65 In this part of his opinion, however, Justice Harlan, 
like the Westcott Court after him, relied not on the inherent 
remedial power of the Supreme Court, but rather on his inter­
pretation of Congressional remedial intent. Pointing to the 
"broad severability clause"66 in the Selective Service .statute and 
the "intensity of [legislative] commitment to the residual 
62 [d. at 361. 
63 [d. at 362-63. 
64 [d. at 362. 
65 [d. at 363-67. 
66 [d. at 364 (citing Universal Military Training and Service Act Amend­
ments, ch. 144, § 5, 65 Stat. 88 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 451(n) (1982)). 
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policy"67 of honoring conscientious objection to war, Justice 
Harlan concurred in the extension of exemption as a necessary 
"patchwork of judicial decision making that cures the defect of 
underinclusion."68 
The classification under review in Welsh provided as 
follows: 
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to 
require any person to be subject to combatant training 
and service in the armed forces of the United States 
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is con­
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any 
form. Religious training and belief in this connection 
means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme 
Being involving duties superior to those arising from 
any human relation, but does not include essentially 
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a 
merely personal moral code.69 
In light of this statutory language, Justice' Harlan's reliance on 
congressional policy as the basis for extending conscientious 
objector status to nonreligious objectors is as problematic as the 
Westcott majority's analogous attempt to derive authority for 
extension of AFDC unemployed parent benefits to families with 
unemployed mothers. Justice Harlan was undoubtedly correct 
in emphasizing that "the policy of exempting religious consci­
entious objectors is one of longstanding tradition and accords 
recognition to . . . the important value of reconciling individu­
ality of belief with practical exigencies whenever possible. "70 
Nevertheless, in light of the statutory language which empha­
sized "religious training and belief,"71 defined as "belief in re­
lation to a Supreme Being,"72 and which deliberately excluded 
recognition of "essentially political, sociological, or philosoph­
67 [d. at 365. 
68 [d. at 366-67. 
69 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336, citing 62 Stat. 612. 
70 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 365-66 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). 
71 [d. at 365. 
72 [d. 
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ical views, or a merely personal moral code,"73 it is difficult to 
deny the force of the contrary argument expressed in Justice 
White's dissenting opinion: 
Even if Welsh is quite right in asserting that exempting 
religious believers is an establishment of religion for­
bidden by the First Amendment, he nevertheless re­
mains one of those persons whom Congress took pains 
not to relieve from military duty . . . . If it is contrary 
to the express will of Congress to exempt Welsh, as I 
think it is, then there is no warrant for saving the 
religious exemption and the statute by redrafting it in 
this Court to include Welsh and all others like him.74 
In sum, Welsh, no less than Westcott, illustrates the proposition 
that when two or more competing goals motivate passage of an 
underinclusive statute, it is difficult at best for a reviewing court 
to ascertain which of the policies was more important to the 
enacting legislature. 
The epistemological difficulty inherent in trying to discover 
unstated legislative remedial intent is not, however, the most 
serious problem with a posture of complete judicial deference 
to the exercise of legislative remedial power. As Heckler v. 
Mathews7S illustrates, the most serious problem is the threat to 
the effective exercise of judicial review presented by a crystal 
clear legislative remedial preference. 
II. Heckler v. Mathews 
A. 	The Statutory Background: The Pension Offset Scheme of 
the 1977 Social Security Amendments 
The Federal Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance 
Benefits Program of the Social Security Act76 has long provided 
spousal benefits for the wives, husbands, widows, and widowers 
73/d. 
74 [d. at 368 (White, J., dissenting). 
75 104 S.Ct. 1387 (1984). 
76 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (1982). 
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of retired and disabled wage earners.77 Until March of 1977, 
when the Supreme Court decided Califano v. Goldfarb,18 men 
seeking these benefits were required by statute to demonstrate 
dependency on their wives for at least one half of their support.79 . 
Women, however, qualified for spousal benefits without regard 
to dependency on their husbands.80 In Goldfarb, the Supreme 
Court held that the one-half support requirement applied to 
.applicants for widowers' benefits violated the equal protection 
guarantee of the due process clause of the fifthamendrnent. 81 
Three weeks later, the Court summarily affirmed two district 
court decisions invalidating the dependency requirement for 
husbands' benefits.82 In all three of these cases, the victorious 
challengers were awarded the Social Security benefits they 
sought.83 None of the decisions discussed Congress' remedial 
intentions or the remedial powers of the federal courts. 
In December 1977, Congress amended the Social Security 
Act. One of the amendments, known as the Pension Offset 
Provision, required that spousal benefits be reduced by the 
amount of certain federal or state government pensions received 
by otherwise eligible claimants.84 Although the offset generally 
applied to benefits payable to applicants who filed in or after 
December 1977,85 its effects were mitigated by an exception. 
Under this exception, those spouses becoming eligible for a 
government pension prior to December 1982 and who also qual­
ified for Social Security spousal benefits under the act "as it was 
in effect and being administered in January 1977" (prior to Gold­
77 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), (c), (e), (0 (1982). 
78 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
79 Former 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(c)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D) (1974)(amended by Social 
Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, §§ 334(b)(1), (d)(1), 91 
Stat. 1544, 1545 (1977)). 
80 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1974). 
81 430 U.S. at 204. 
82 Califano v. Silbowitz, 430 U.S. 924 (1977); Califano v. Jablon, 430 U.S. 
924 (1977). 
83 See also Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 312. 
84 Social Security Amendments of 1977, §§ 334(a)(2), (b)(2), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 402(b)(4)(A), (c)(2)(A) (1982). 
85 Social Security Amendments of 1977, § 334(0, 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) 
(1982). 
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farb) were permanently exempted from the offset.86 The effect 
of the exception was thus to re-enact the classification held 
unconstitutional in Goldfarb, albeit for the purpose of allocating 
the burden of a benefit offset rather than ascertaining basic 
eligibility.87 
Anticipating the possible unconstitutionality of the pension 
offset exception, Congress added a reverse severability clause 
which provided that "if any provision of this subsection . .4 is• 
held invalid, the remainder of the section shall not be affected 
thereby, but the application of this subsection to any other 
persons or circumstances shall also be considered invalid. "88 
The operation of this severability provision was plain enough: 
If the exception ("this subsection") to this offset was held un­
constitutional, it would simply be nullified, leaving the offset 
scheme ("this section") applicable to all claimants. Thus, the 
unambiguous legislative remedial intent, in the event that the 
exception was held to violate the equal protection guarantee, 
was that it be nullified rather than extended to include those 
injured by its unconstitutional underinclusiveness. 
B. The Practical Impact ofAnticipatory Nullification 
The offset exception and its accompanying reverse sever­
ability clause had the effect, therefore, of re-enacting an argu­
86 Social Security Amendments of 1977, § 334(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) 
(1982). 
87 By its terms, this exception expired on December 1, 1982. On January 
12, 1983 a new pension offset provision was signed into law. This provision, 
drafted in sex-neutral terms, excepts from the offset any person who becomes 
eligible for a public pension before July 1983 and who satisfies a one-half 
support dependency test. Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-455, § 7, 96 
Stat. 2497, 2501. On April 20, 1983, Congress further revised the offset, 
extending the exception clause as to individuals who become eligible to retire 
after July 1983 but reducing the offset for those retirees from 100 percent to 
two-thirds of the public pension. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. 
L. No. 98-21, § 337, 97 Stat. 65, 131-32. 
88 Social Security Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1982). The 
legislative history of the clause indicates that it was enacted "so that if [the 
pension offset exception] is found invalid the pension offset ... would not be 
affected, and the application of the exception clause would not be broadened 
to include persons or circumstances that are not included within it." H.R. 
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ably unconstitutional classification and simultaneously preclud­
ing a reviewing court from granting any tangible relief to persons 
harmed by it, This combination raises a number of practical 
problems with the Westcott-Welsh approach to the extension! 
nullification dilemma. 
The problems begin with the impact on the litigation process 
itself.· The non-dependent men who lose Social Security benefits 
because of the underinclusiveness of the offset exception are 
left remediless, in the same position in which Elliott Welsh 
would have found himself had the Supreme Court cured the 
underinclusiveness of the conscientious objector statutes by nul­
lifying them, leaving Welsh's conviction intact. Indeed, the men 
injured by the offset provision are, in a sense, worse off than 
Welsh. Unlike him, they know in advance of litigation that a 
successful constitutional challenge to the statutory source of 
their injury will be fruitless. The unmistakable clarity of Con­
gress' preferred remedy as expressed by the severability clause 
leaves no doubt that these men can vindicate their constitutional 
right to equal treatment only by causing others (many no doubt 
needy and deserving) to forfeit benefits on which they have 
relied. Precious few will be so committed to the principle of 
equality, or so callous about the consequences of their "suc­
cess," to pursue this sort of abstract and ambiguous vindication 
of their rights. Moreover, even fewer lawyers will be enthusias­
tic about litigating claims which hold no promise of any tangible 
return.89 
Com. Rep. No. 95-837, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1977); S. Com. Rep. No. 95­
612, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1977). Compare the language of this clause with 
that of the general Social Security Act severability clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1303 
(1982), supra note 49. 
89 The constitutionality of the pension offset exception was challenged in 
seven cases, all but one filed pro se. Webb v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 81 (9th 
Cir. 1983), cert. granted, vacated and remanded for consideration in light of 
Heckler v. Mathews sub nom. Heckler v. Webb, 104 S. Ct. 1583 (1984); 
Rosofsky v. Schweiker, 523 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),prob.juris. noted, 
456 U.S. 959, appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1141 (1982); Miller v. Dep't of 
Health and Human Services, 517 F.Supp. 1192 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Caloger v. 
Harris, 1981 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1f 17,754 (D. Md. Mar. 25,1981); Duffy 
v. Harris, 1979 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1f 16,906 (D.N.M. Oct. 23, 1979); 
Wachtell v. Schweiker, No. 80-8022 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 1982), appeal filed, 
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Assume however, that a litigant clears these formidable, 
hurdles and files a lawsuit challenging the exception's unconsti­
tutionality. Assume further that the federal district judge hearing 
the suit agrees with the challengers' arguments and holds that 
the exception constitutes impermissible sex discrimination in 
violation of the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amend­
ment. How is the judge to give effect to this holding? Forbidden 
to grant any relief to the "victorious" plaintiffs, the judge must 
order the Department of Health and Human Services to stop 
paying benefits to the women and dependent men favored by 
the exception; but can a single federal judge properly issue an 
order cutting off federal benefits to thousands ofpeople through­
out the United States when none of those people have had an 
opportunity to be heard? Justice Harlan's Welsh concurrence 
implies not,90 and Dean LaFrance has argued that members of 
the favored class at least must be afforded an opportunity to 
intervene before a nullification order can issue.91 Regardless of 
how these questions might ultimately be answered, most federal 
judges would be reluctant to strip away the benefit entitlements 
No. 82-5552 (11th Cir. Apr. 30, 1982). The single case in which the plaintiff 
was represented by counsel was Mathews v. Heckler, 1982 Unemp!. Ins. Rep. 
(CCH) 1114,313 (N .D. Ala. Aug. 24, 1982), rev'd 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984), where, 
of course, the constitutionality of the severability clause was also challenged. 
90 398 U.S. 333, 364 n.16 (l970)(Harian, J., concurring in result). 
91 LaFrance, supra note 53, at 440 (arguing that nullification of a benefit 
would ... deny due process to those who were in the favored class 
but who are to lose their benefits because of the 'success' of the 
excluded class in persuading the court to deny benefits to all. Those 
originally favored would not have been heard. Perhaps they might 
have intervened; perhaps they might have been ably represented 
by the government. Perhaps not.) 
COlltra Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 321-22 (arguing that since no tenable 
constitutional objection could likely be raised to a complete repeal of a benefit 
program, neither can quasi-legislative judicial nullification of a benefit program 
be challenged, at least to the extent it operates prospectively). Judge Ginsburg 
also points out, however, that the absence of at least some judicial remedial 
power "would immunize from judicial review statutes that confer benefits 
unevenly. The legislature would have power, unchecked by the judiciary, to 
contract the equal protection principle in a significant class of cases." Id. at 
303. 
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of large numbers of innocent recipients because of the success 
of another claimant's constitutional argument.92 
Even if a nullification order were issued by a court, or by 
the Department of Health and Human Services following an 
adjudication of the exception's unconstitutionality, it is not at 
all clear how broadly the policy of nullification must extend. It 
would presumably apply to all future benefits, but might the 
order not also have to require recoupment of all benefits pre­
viously paid to the favored class? Mter all, sovereign immu­
nity,93 as well as the severability clause itself, would appear to 
bar an award of retroactive benefits to the "successful" members 
of the class disfavored by the exception. The goal of equal 
treatment apparently could be achieved, therefore, only by such 
retrospective recoupment. Can a court, though, properly inflict 
this severe hardship on recipients whose benefits turn out to be 
contingent on the constitutional claims of others? These ques­
tions present problems that most reviewing courts will properly 
feel ill-equipped to resolve and thus anxious to avoid. Further­
more, the unattractive consequences of a declaration of uncon­
stitutionality might tilt the judgment of some judges in favor of 
sustaining the underlying classification. 
Despite these obstructive effects on the exercise of consti­
tutional judicial review, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld 
the constitutionality of the offset exception severability clause 
in Heckler v. Mathews. 94 Indeed, the practical impact of the 
clause received no mention in Justice Brennan's opinion for the 
Court. The decision to ignore this impact permitted the Court 
to avoid directly facing a troubling set of theoretical problems. 
An examination of Justice Brennan's Mathews opinion, how­
ever, will show that this avoidance rests on a fiction which 
92 See, e.g., Rosofsky v. Schweiker, 523 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), 
prob. juris noted, 456 U.S. 959, appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1141 (1982), in 
which the district court, after holding the pension offset provision unconsti­
tutional and acknowledging the limits imposed by the severability clause, 
neither extended nor nullified the exception, thus giving no effect at all to the 
judgment of unconstitutionality. 457 U.S. at 1187-88. 
93 Federal sovereign immunity has been held to bar the award of damages 
in the form of retroactive benefits against the United States. United States v. 
Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976). 
94 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984). 
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entails equally serious problems of its own. Once this fiction is 
identified, the clause proves to be unconstitutional on a number 
of alternative grounds. An examination of these grounds will in 
addition illuminate the proper roles of legislative discretion and 
judicial responsibility in remedying unconstitutionally underin­
clusive classifications. 
C. The Decision 
1. The District Court Opinion 
Robert Mathews, a retired postal worker, challenged the 
constitutionality of both the Social Security pension offset ex­
ception and the accompanying severability clause in a class 
action complaint filed in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama. District Judge Guin certified a 
nationwide class composed of "all applicants for husband's in­
surance benefits ... whose applications ... have been denied 
. . . solely because of the statutory requirement that husbands 
must have received more than one-half of their support from 
their wives in order to be entitled to benefits."95 Judge Guin 
then held both the offset exception and the severability clause 
unconstitutional. He rested his invalidation of the exception on 
Craig v. Boren and Califano v. Goldfarb, finding that the reen­
actment of the Goldfarb classification was not substantially re­
lated to the achievement of any important governmental 
objective.96 
Judge Guin viewed the severability clause as an improper 
congressional curtailment of article III jurisdiction over a con­
stitutional claim, because it was "an adroit attempt to discourage 
the bringing of an action by destroying standing. "97 The clause 
destroyed standing with its effort 
to mandate the outcome ofany challenge to the validity 
of the [pension offset] exception by making such a 
9S Mathews v. Heckler, 1982 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH), 'il14,313 at 2405 
(N.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984). 
96 1982 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) at 2406-08. 
97 [d. at 2408. 
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challenge fruitless. Even if a plaintiff achieved success 
in having the gender-based classification stricken, he 
would derive no personal benefit from the decision, 
because the pension offset would be applied to all ap­
plicants without exception.98 
This kind of "'in terrorem' approach insulates the legislative 
work product from judicial review, in violation of the doctrine 
of separation of powers."99 It therefore amounted to "an uncon­
stitutional usurpation of judicial power. "100 
2. The Supreme Court Decision 
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed 
each of Judge Guin's holdings. Because of its jurisdictional 
implications, Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court first ad­
dressed the severability clause. Justice Brennan found that the 
clause did not undermine Mathews' standing to sue or threaten 
the exercise of article III jurisdiction, because the right asserted 
by the Mathews class was not the right to Social Security ben­
efits but rather the right to a benefit distribution scheme that 
was free of unconstitutional sex discrimination. lol 
Justice Brennan maintained that the Court had "never sug­
gested that the injuries caused by a constitutionally underinclu­
sive scheme can be remedied only by extending the program's 
benefits to the excluded class."lo2 Citing Califano v. Westcott l03 
and Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Welsh v. United 
States,I04 he pointed out that a court which sustains a claim of 
unconstitutional underinclusiveness "faces 'two remedial alter­
natives: [it] may either declare [the statute] a nullity and order 
that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature in­
tended to benefit or it may extend the coverage of the statute 
98/d. 
99 Id. 
lOll [d. 
101 Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. at 1394-96. 

102 Id. at 1394. 

103 443 U.S. 76, 89-91 (1979). 

104 398 U.S. 333, 344, 351 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result). 
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to include those who are aggrieved by the exclusion. "'105 The 
availability of these alternatives demonstrated that 
the right to equal treatment . . . is not co-extensive 
with any substantive rights to the benefits denied the 
party discriminated against. Rather, . . . discrimination 
itself, by perpetuating "archaic and stereo typic no­
tions" or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored 
group as "innately inferior" and therefore as less wor­
thy participants in the political community . . . can 
cause serious non-economic injuries to those persons 
who are personally denied equal treatment solely be­
cause of their membership in a disfavored group. 106 
Justice Brennan then referred to Justice Brandeis' opinion for 
the Court in Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett,107 
reading that opinion to stand for the proposition that when the 
right invoked is that of equal treatment, the appropriate remedy 
is a mandate of equal treatment, "a result that can be accom­
plished by withdrawal of benefits from the favored class as well 
as by the extension of benefits to the excluded class."108 
For Justice Brennan, therefore, the injury inflicted by the 
Social Security pension offset exception was not the denial of 
the Social Security benefits sought by Robert Mathews and his 
class, but rather the stigmatization or stereotyping inherent in 
the sex classification under which those benefits were withheld. 
Since the stigma would be removed by a decision declaring the 
exception unconstitutional and discontinuing payment of bene­
fits to similarly situated women, the injury suffered by Mathews 
and his class would be redressed by a favorable disposition of 
their constitutional claim, notwithstanding the severability 
clause. For this reason, the clause did not withdraw Mathews' 
standing to sue and presented no threat to the Court's assump­
tion of jurisdiction to decide his suit. 109 
lOS Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. at 1394. 

106 [d. at 1395. 

107 284 U.S. 239 (1931). 

108 Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. at 1395. 

109 [d. at 1395-96. 
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In a footnote, Justice Brennan cited Justice Powell's state­
ment in dissent in Califano v. Westcott that a "court should not, 
of course, 'use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of 
the legislature. "'110 He noted that the severability clause clearly 
expressed Congress' "preference for nullification, rather than 
extension, of the pension offset exception in the event it is found 
invalid."lll Justice Brennan then acknowledged the possibility 
that legislative withdrawal of a court's authority to remedy con­
stitutional violations would itself violate the Constittltion. This 
issue was not, however, presented by the pension offset excep­
tion severability clause, since, by Justice Brennan's reasoning, 
the clause did not foreclose judicial redress for the injuries 
asserted by Mathews and his class. ll2 
Justice Brennan then turned to the merits of Mathews' 
challenge to the pension offset exception. He based his judgment 
that the exception did not violate the equal protection guarantee 
on a finding that the re-adoption of the pre-Goldfarb classifica­
tion, instead of reflecting the stereotypic assumptions which 
animated its original enactment, was substantially related to the 
achievement of the "important governmental objective"1l3 of 
protecting the reliance interests of those who expected to re­
ceive the benefits provided under the original enactment. 114 
III. Heckler v. Mathews and the Threat to Judicial Review: 

A Dangerous Fiction and Three Unresolved Problems 

Part II above suggested that Justice Brennan's validation 
of the pension offset severability clause in Heckler v. Mathews 
was based on a fiction. The fiction is that the injury inflicted by 
an unconstitutionally underinclusive statute is not the denial of 
the benefit (or imposition of the burden) distributed by that 
statute, but is instead something more intangible, like the inflic­
tion of stigma or the iegislative endorsement of archaic stereo-
l1°Id. at 1394 n.5 (quoting Westcott, 443 U.S. at 93, 94 (powell, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 

113 Id. at 1398. 

114Id. at 1398-1401. 
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types. Legislative stigmatization and stereotyping may be good 
reasons for remedying the injury caused by a statutory classifi­
cation, but, at least in the case of an underinclusive classifica­
tion, they are not themselves the injury. By assuming that they 
are, Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Heckler v. Ma­
thews manages to avoid facing at least three thorny constitu­
tional issues presented by the severability clause. First, if en­
forced, the clause would abridge the constitutional right of the 
Mathews class to a remedy for the injury inflicted on them by 
the underinclusiveness of the pension offset exception. Second, 
by foreclosing the award of any remedy to the Mathews class, 
the severability clause removes their standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the offset exception, which amounts to an 
improper attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
to hear and decide constitutional claims. Finally, this same fo­
reclosure of judicial relief undercuts the Mathews class' first 
amendment right to petition the courts for redress ofgrievances. 
This Section will show that the court's evasion of these 
issues in Heckler v. Mathews did not succeed in making. them 
disappear. They remain because Justice Brennan's fiction-that 
stigma is the injury at stake in Mathews-fails to address the 
very practical problem that unifies all three issues: Anticipatory 
nullification clauses threaten judicial review of unconstitutional 
classifications by removing the incentive of persons harmed by 
such classifications to dispute them in court. 
A. The Constitutional Right to a Remedy 
1. Historical and Doctrinal Underpinnings 
The most obvious problem with the pension offset excep­
tion severability provision is the one that concerned Justice 
Harlan in his Welsh concurrence: 115 By directing that the benefit 
conferred by an underinclusive classification be nullified in the 
event the underinclusiveness is held unconstitutional, the clause 
deprives members of the excluded class of any tangible remedy 
for violation of their constitutional rights. For the Court in 
Mathews, the eradication of the assumed injuries of stigma and 
liS Welsh, 398 U.S. at 344,362 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). 
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role-typing are a constitutionally sufficient substitute. Justice 
Brennan's resolution of Mathews is seriously flawed, however, 
if (1) a person injured by a violation of the Constitution is en­
titled to an adequate remedy for the injury and (2) nullification 
of the authority to confer benefits on the class favored by an 
unconstitutionally underinc1usive statute is not constitutionally 
adequate, even though such nullification cures the unconstitu­
tional underinc1usiveness. The premises that underlie the Su­
preme Court's development of constitutional remedies establish 
the validity of each of these propositions. 
Justice Brennan's opinion in Heckler v. Mathews specifi­
cally declines to address the question whether Congress may 
thwart a court's ability to remedy a constitutional violation. 
Still, as the introduction to this article suggested, the notion 
that persons injured by unconstitutional government action are 
entitled to a remedy is well established. The roots of the prop­
osition that a remedy for a constitutional wrong is essential to 
the process of judicial review can be traced at least as far back 
as Blackstone116 and, through him, to Marbury v. Madison.ll7 
The Supreme Court's landmark 1946 decision in Bell v. 
Hood118 underscores the importance of the remedial powers of 
116 In the Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland, Blackstone wrote: 
[1]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal 
right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever 
that right is invaded .... [1]t is a settled and invariable principle 
in the laws of England, that every right when with-held must have 
a remedy, and every injury it's (sic) proper redress. 
3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, *23, *109. 
117 Chief Justice Marshall relied on Blackstone's summation for his state­
ment in Marbury: 
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he 
receives an injury .... The government of the United States has 
been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. 
It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws 
furnish no remedy for the violation of a v~sted legal right. 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
118 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 
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a federal court to the exercise of the judicial function. In holding 
that a damage action against FBI officers for violations of the 
fourth and fifth amendments was within the federal question 
jurisdiction, the Court, speaking through Justice Black, noted: 
It is established practice for this Court to sustain the 
jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to 
protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution and to 
restrain individual state officers from doing what the 
14th Amendment forbids the state to do. Moreover, 
where federally protected rights have been invaded, it 
has been the rule from the beginning that courts will 
be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the 
necessary relief. And it is also well settled that where 
legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute 
provides for a general right to sue for that invasion, 
federal courts may use any available remedy to make 
good the wrong done. 119 
Six years later, in the Steel Seizure case,120 the Court applied 
these principles to sustain a district court's issuance of a prelim­
inary injunction restraining enforcement of President Truman's 
order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take control of 
most of the nation's steel mills. The Court based its affirmance 
of the injunction on its finding that "equity's extraordinary ... 
relief' 121 was the only means of ensuring the threatened com­
panies an adequate remedy for unconstitutionally inflicted 
injuries. 
The notion that the remedial power of the federal courts is 
inherent, and not therefore subject to congressional curtailment, 
draws further support from decisions of the Supreme Court 
sustaining the power of Congress to withdraw particular reme­
dies from the judicial arsenal on condition that other constitu­
tionally adequate forms of relief remain available to persons 
119 [d. at 684. 

120 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 

121 [d. at 584. 
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claiming Injury from unconstitutional government action. 122 
These decisions, as well as "reasons of principle,"123 formed the 
basis for Professor Henry Hart's conclusion, in his famous dia­
logue on congressional power to limit federal court jurisdiction, 
that Congress does not have the power to withdraw all remedies 
for constitutional wrongs. 
Moreover, the fact that some kind of remedy may be avail­
able may not be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of article 
III. If the only avenue of redress available to a victim of uncon­
stitutional government action is so excessively narrow, burden­
some or risky as to operate as a significant deterrent to the 
commencement of challenging litigation, its very restrictiveness 
may violate the Constitution. This notion dates from such early 
rate regulation cases as Ex parte Young,124 which invalidated a 
state regulatory scheme that precluded judicial review of rate 
orders except as a defense to criminal prosecution. More re­
cently, it has been applied in decisions establishing a limited 
right to pre-injunction judicial review of claims of clear depar­
ture by the selective service system from statutory and consti­
122 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (sustaining the Emergency 
Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23. The Act provided that wartime 
price regulations could be invalidated only by the Emergency Court of Appeals 
created by the Act, or by the Supreme Court on review of that court's 
judgments. This restriction was upheld on the basis of the constitutional 
adequacy of the separate procedure. Id. at 444); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 
How.) 236, 250 (1845) (sustaining Congress's power to withdraw a right of 
action against a collector of customs for duties claimed to have been exacted 
illegally so long as claimants were left with "other modes of redress," such as 
replevin or detinue to recover goods seized for nonpayment of assessed duties 
or trover upon payment of that amount of duty admitted to be due); see also 
Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdic­
tion, 83 Yale L.J. 498, 524-32 (1974). See generally Hart, The Power of 
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction ofFederal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 
66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1366--67 (1953). 
123 Hart, supra note 122, at 1370. 
124 209 U.S. 123, 146-48 (1908). See also Oklahoma Operating Co. v. 
Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1920); Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340 
(1913) (both dealing with the need to preserve an opportunity for judicial 
review of a legislative fixed rate). But cf Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (both narrowing the 
power of federal courts to enjoin state criminal proce-edings). 
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tutionallimitations. 125 The principle underlying these cases, that 
a legislature may not enact remedial schemes which seriously 
dissuade persons with constitutional claims from seeking judicial 
review, would seem directly applicable to the Social Security 
pension offset exception severability clause at issue in Heckler 
v. Mathews. 126 
The propositions that vindication of a constitutional right 
includes an adequate remedy, and that Congress may not de­
prive the federal courts of the power to fashion such a remedy, 
have been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court's recent line of 
decisions grounding the requirement of an adequate remedy for 
a constitutional violation in the article III powers of the federal 
courts and in the necessary implications of the right violated. 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents ofthe Federal Bureau 
ofNarcotics, 127 the Court sustained a claim for damages against 
federal agents for the injuries caused by a warrantless search 
and arrest in violation of the fourth amendment. Although no 
federal statute authorized such a claim, the damage award was 
properly within the power of a federal court, because of the 
principle announced in Bell v. Hood that "where federally pro­
tected rights have been invaded, . . . courts will be alert to 
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. "128 The 
Bivens Court then emphasized that an effective remedy for its 
violation was inherent in the protection afforded by the fourth 
amendment: 
[W]e cannot accept respondents' formulation of the 
question as whether the availability of money damages 
is necessary to enforce the Fourth Amendment. For 
we have here no explicit congressional declaration that 
125 See, e.g., Breen v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16,396 U.S. 460 
(1970); Oestereich v. Selective Service Sys. Local Board No. 11, 393 U.S. 
233 (1968). But see Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968); Peterson v. Clark 
285 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd per curiam 411 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 
1969). See ge1lerally P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart 
& Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 365-72 (2d ed. 
1973). 
126 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984). 
127 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
128 327 U.S. at 684.. 
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persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the 
Fourth Amendment may not recover damages from the 
agents, but inust instead be remitted to another rem­
edy, equally effective in the view of Congress. 129 
Bivens thus acknowledges the primary responsibility of Con­
gress to provide remedies for injuries inflicted by the unconsti­
tutional conduct of federal officials, but it also underscores the 
power of the federal courts to afford constitutionally sufficient 
relief in the event Congress fails to carry out that responsibility. 
In Davis v. Passman,130 the Court extended the Bivens 
principle to fifth amendment equal protection rights of the kind 
raised by the pension offset exception. Davis involved a claim 
by a congressional staff member that she had been discharged 
on the basis of her sex.131 Again the Court sustained a damages 
remedy, this time emphasizing that because the employer was 
no longer a member of Congress, no other form of relief, such 
as an injunction requiring reinstatement, was available. For Ms. 
Davis, it was "damages or nothing."132 Davis takes on additional 
significance for purposes of evaluating the offset exception 
severability clause, because the damage remedy was upheld 
despite Congress's deliberate decision to exempt its members 
from the employment discrimination remedies made available 
to executive branch employees through Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.133 Congress' decision to foreclose all statu­
tory remedies to Ms. Davis did not preclude a federal court 
from vindicating her right to an adequate constitutional remedy. 
Carlson v. Green,134 decided one year after Davis, involved 
a claim that the failure of federal prison officials to provide 
medical care to the plaintiff's son had caused his death in vio­
lation of the eighth amendment protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment.135 The Court again sustained a claim for 
129 403 U.S. at 397. 
130 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
131Id. at 23l. 
132Id. at 245. 
133 § 717, 86 Stat. 111,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982). 
134 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
135Id. at 16. 
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damages. As in Davis (but unlike Bivens), the Court did not 
adjudicate against a background of congressional silence on the 
type of remedy to be made available to persons in Ms. Carlson's 
situation. After Bivens, Congress had amended the Federal Tort 
Claims Act136 to allow recovery against the United States for 
constitutional torts of the kind at issue in both Bivens and Carl­
son. 137 The Court nevertheless rejected the argument that this 
amendment superseded a damages remedy against the officials 
under the Constitution. Congress had provided no indication 
that the amendment was intended to substitute for a Bivens 
remedy.138 More important, because of its relative ineffective­
ness in comparison to a damage action, the Federal Tort Claims 
Act remedy was "not a sufficient protector of the citizens' con­
stitutional rights. "139 
Finally, in Bush v. Lucas,140 the Supreme Court affirmed 
the dismissal of a damages claim by a federal employee demoted 
by his superiors, allegedly in violation of his first amendment 
rightS.141 This time the Court held that the comprehensive rem­
edies available to the plaintiff under Civil Service Commission 
regulations, including retroactive reinstatement, back pay, and 
retroactive seniority, were adequate to vindicate his first amend­
ment claim.142 The Court reiterated, however, that the federal 
courts' power to grant relief not authorized by Congress is firmly 
established and that this power includes the authority to provide 
a remedy to enforce constitutional rights. 143 
2. The Remedial Inadequacy ofNullification 
From Marbury v. Madison down through the 1982-83 
term,l44 then, the Supreme Court's examination of the remedial 
136 Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 842. 
137 Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2680(h) (1982). 
138 Car/SOil, 446 U.S. at 20; see also S. Rep. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
3 (1973). 
139 Car/SOil, 446 U.S. at 23. 
140 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983). 
141 Id. at 2406. 
142Id. at 2414-16. 
143Id. at 2409-11. 
144 In his brief on behalf of Secretary Heckler in Heckler v. Mathews, the 
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phase of constitutional litigation underscores the proposition 
that a person injured by unconstitutional government action is 
Solicitor General argued that the Bivens line of authority does not support the 
proposition that a person injured by unconstitutional government action is 
entitled to an adequate remedy for the injury. The Solicitor maintained that 
the judicially fashioned relief granted in Bivens and the cases following it was 
constitutionally authorized only because none of these cases was a suit against 
the federal government, therefore raising no issue of sovereign immunity. 
Appellant's reply brief at 16 n.15, Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984). 
The Solicitor's implication is that the availability of a sovereign immunity 
defense against unconsented suits against the federal government shows that 
there are indeed situations in which no relief may be granted for an unconsti­
tutionally inflicted injury. 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, will not support this claim. 
To begin with, the relief sought in Mathews, Westcott, and other constitutional 
relief cases arising in the context of public benefit programs is not damages 
against the United States, a remedy that is indeed precluded by sovereign 
immunity, United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399-407 (1976); cf Edelman 
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)(rejecting an award of money damages against 
a state government as contrary to the Eleventh Amendment), but rather 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of an unconstitution­
ally underinclusive eligibility rule. Any monetary benefits sought in such cases 
are prospective only and flow directly from such declaratory and injunctive 
relief. Sovereign immunity does not bar these remedies. Testan, 424 U.S. at 
399-407; see also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1975). As Pro­
fessor Sager has pointed out, 
The power of the federal courts to grant equitable relief to protect 
claimants has always been assumed, and the federal courts have 
been willing to go to great lengths to make such relief possible. 
See, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Osborn v. President 
of The Bank of The United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
Recent controversies over the Court's authority to issue remedies 
for constitutional violations have assumed the propriety and im­
portance of anticipatory relief; any debate has concerned damages. 
Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Reg­
ulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 85 n.214 
(1981). Moreover, even "damages," in the form of retroactive benefits, are 
not barred by sovereign immunity if awarded in the context of a statutory 
scheme that provides generally for such benefits. Wright v. Califano, 603 F.2d 
666 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980). 
Professor Sager's point additionally survives the Court's recognition of 
the immunity of certain federal and state officials from damage actions. The 
decisions establishing official immunity acknowledge the availability of alter­
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entitled to adequate relief from the injury. 145 Still, the question 
remains whether nullification of the award of benefits to the 
class favored by an unconstitutionally underinclusive statute 
provides such relief to members of the disfavored class. The 
most fully developed argument that it does not is, perhaps iron­
ically, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Welsh v. United 
States. 146 
native forms of relief against public officials from injuries caused by their 
unconstitutional acts. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 n.37, 757­
58,736-39 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504, 514-16 (1978); Imbler 
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 3"14 
n.6 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 
386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 370-71, 378­
80 (1951). 
In situations, therefore, in which the doctrine of official immunity pre­
cludes an award of monetary relief, the power of the federal courts to provide 
constitutionally adequate alternative remedies becomes an integral element of 
the "paramount authority of the federal constitution." Sterling v. Constantin, 
287 U.S. 378, 397-98 (1932). In the absence of such power "it is manifest that 
the fiat of [a public official] would be the supreme law of the land; that the 
restrictions of the federal Constitution upon the exercise of [governmental] 
power would be but impotent phrases ...." [d. at 397; See also General Oil 
v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 236 (1908). 
145 Professor Sager has reached a similar conclusion in the course of his 
analysis of the scope of Congress' constitutional power to limit the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts: 
If ... a constitutional claimant has a right to have his or her claim 
heard in a court capable of fairly and independently adjudicating 
it, then the court in question must be empowered to grant relief 
that is at least reasonably effective. Otherwise, the right to ajudicial 
hearing would be meaningless. Remedies for constitutional wrongs, 
like other legal remedies, chiefly involve measures either to prevent 
or terminate the wrong or to redress the harm caused by past 
unconstitutional conduct. Hobbling the judiciary by denying it all 
reasonably effective remedies is as fatal to a litigant's effort to 
vindicate constitutional rights as is flatly denying the litigant a 
judicial forum. 
Sager, supra note 154, at 85; see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 
(1932); Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 1109, 1112-18 (1969); 
Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 530-32. 
146 398 U.S. 333, 344-45 (1970). 
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Justice Harlan's Welsh concurrence has served as the cor­
nerstone for virtually all subsequent discussion of the extension! 
nullification problem, including, as seen above, that in Heckler 
v. Mathews. 147 While his discussion in dicta of how he would 
dispose of a civil case challenging the constitutionality of the 
conscientious objection classification provides obvious support 
for Justice Brennan's validation of the pension offset exception 
severability clause, Justice Harlan's view of the proper holding 
in the case actually before him rests on two other propositions 
that point in a very different direction. The first of these prop­
ositions is that the federal courts have inherent authority to 
extend the coverage of a federal statute. In light of the numerous 
cases in which the Supreme Court has routinely and without 
discussion approved extension, this may not appear to be a 
terribly significant point. Justice Harlan's persuasive affirmation 
of this authority does, however, effectively refute the occasional 
suggestion in earlier opinions and in lower court decisions that 
extension is a forbidden remedy because it amounts to ''judicial 
legislation."148 For purposes of a case like Califano v. Westcott, 
147 Most notably, all nine justices in Califano v. Westcott adopted the 
remedial approach fashioned by Justice Harlan in Welsh. See supra text 
accompanying notes 28-33; see also, e.g., Taxation with Representation v. 
Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 742-44 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds 103 S. 
Ct. 1997 (1983)(discussed infra note 181); Greenberg v. Bolger, 497 F. Supp. 
756,784-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)(extending reduced mailing rates to minor political 
parties); Mertz v. Harris, 497 F. Supp. 1134, 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1980)(extending 
Social Security survivors' benefits to widowers); In Re Evans, 4 Bankr. 232, 
235 (S.D. Ala. 1980)(excepting alimony due husbands from release of a dis­
charge in bankruptcy); Andrade v. Nadel, 477 F. Supp~ 1275, 1278-79 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979)(extending civil service veterans preference to lawfully ad­
mitted aliens); Stevens v. Califano, 448 F. Supp. 1313, 1323-24 (N.D. 1078), 
affd 443 U.S. 901 (1979)(extending AFDC benefits to families with female 
breadwinner); Vacarella v. Fusari, 365 F. Supp. 1164, 1170 (D. Conn. 
1973)(extending unemployment compensation dependency allowance to de­
pendent minor sister of covered worker). 
148 See e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 60 n.18 (1968) 
(declining to sever unconstitutional provision of federal wagering tax statute 
because court "would be required not merely to strike out words, but to insert 
words that are not now in the statute"); National Life Ins. Co. v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 508, 522, 534-35 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting)(suggesting 
that court has no power to extend unconstitutionally underinclusive tax de­
duction); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70 (1922) (holding that savings clause 
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where the remedial intent of the legislature is uncertain or am­
biguous, Justice Harlan's recognition that nullification, by re­
quiring that "benefits not extend to the class that the legislature 
intended to benefit," entails just as much interference with ex­
pressed legislative will as does extension of benefits to the class 
not included,149 has provided the basis for a general consensus 
that "there is no necessary reason for choosing the intent to 
exclude one group over the intent to include another."150 Even 
in a case like Mathews, where the legislature has directed a 
particular remedy, Justice Harlan's emphasis on the inherent 
powers of the federal courts underscores the notion that the 
ultimate responsibility for assuring the adequacy of constitu­
tional remedies is judicial, not legislative. 
The second proposition of Justice Harlan's Welsh concur­
rence is that the injuries caused by underinclusive statutory 
classifications are tangible and concrete and that these injuries 
call for correspondingly tangible and concrete remedies. Prior 
to Heckler v. Mathews, this may have seemed even less contro­
versial than the notion that courts may extend the coverage of 
underinc1usive statutes. The Mathews decision, however, dem­
onstrates the importance of this proposition to a proper under­
standing of the responsibility of an article III court in constitu­
tional litigation. 
does not authorize judicial "amendment" of unconstitutional classification by 
inserting limitations which it does not contain); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 
478, 484-85 (1922)(holding that unconstitutionality of exception from taxing 
statute required invalidation of statute in its entirety); Spraigue v. Thompson, 
118 U.S. 90, 95 (1886)(holding that unconstitutionality of exceptions from 
harbor pilot statute required invalidation of statute in its entirety); United 
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876)(holding that it "is no part of [this 
Court's] duty ... to limit [a] statute in [such a way as] to make a new law 
[rather than] enforce an old one."); Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 159--60, 
358 A.2d 457, 459--60 (l976)(directing, on theory that court cannot provide 
remedy requiring expenditure of funds, that no state, county or local official 
was to expend any moneys for free public schools until legislature appropriated 
funds for all schools in constitutional manner). 
149 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344, 361 (1970)(Harlan, J., 
concurring in result). 
ISO Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 
1136 (1969). See also Kalina v. Railroad Retirement Board, 541 F.2d 1204, 
1210 (6th Cir. 1976), affd, 431 U.S. 909 (1977); Greenberg v. Bolger, 497 F. 
Supp. 756, 784-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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In Welsh, the unconstitutionality of Welsh's injury plainly 
could have been remedied by nullifying the exemption granted 
to religious objectors. As Justice White pointed out in dissent, 
Welsh had no constitutional claim to exemption independent of 
the fact that it had been granted to others.15l Nevertheless, 
nullification was inadequate as a constitutional remedy. The 
reason, for Justice Harlan and implicitly for Justice White, was 
that while nullification would correct the unconstitutionality of 
the statutory exemption scheme, it would not touch the injury 
suffered by Welsh-the conviction for refusing induction and 
the corresponding prison sentence. This injury could be re­
dressed only by extending the benefit of conscientious objection 
to Welsh and others whose moral opposition to participation in 
war was grounded in secular rather than religious beliefs. 
The distinction is critical: When confronted with an injury 
that is created by an unconstitutionally underinclusive statutory 
classification, the responsibility of a federal court is not simply 
to correct the unconstitutionality but to remedy the injury. Jus­
tice Harlan's concurring opinion in Welsh does not explain his 
unwillingness to extend this principle to injuries beyond those 
stemming from criminal prosecution and conviction.J52 Yet the 
distinction he draws between the correction of unconstitution­
ality and the redress of the injury caused by that unconstitu­
lSI Welsh, 398 U.S. at 368--69 (White, J., dissenting). 
152 The Supreme Court's development of the "unconstitutional conditions" 
doctrine as a tool for analyzing unconstitutional restrictions on the enjoyment 
of public benefits strongly suggests that a distinction between criminal sanc­
tions and civil penalties on the exercise of constitutional rights is no longer 
tenable. In 1892, Justice Holmes could perhaps state with confidence that a 
"petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 
155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892). But contemporary decisions such as Thomas v. 
Review Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)(holding unconsti­
tutional the discontinuance of unemployment insurance to worker who refused 
on religious grounds to work in armaments production) rest firmly on the 
notion that "a person may not be compelled to choose between the exercise 
of a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise available public 
program." 450 U.S. at 716. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963)(holding unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to Sev­
enth Day Adventist refusing to work on the Sabbath); Van Alstyne, The 
Demise of the Right/Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1439 (1968). 
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tionality was anticipated a generation earlier in a decision writ­
ten by Justice Brandeis in a state tax case, Iowa-Des Moines 
National Bank v. Bennett. 1s3 More recently, the Court's treat­
ment of the injury-in-fact element of article III standing in Orr 
v. Orr, IS4 a sex discrimination case challenging an underinclusive 
state alimony scheme, makes clear its understanding prior to 
Heckler v. Mathews that vindication of an abstract right to equal 
treatment through the denial of benefits to others constitutes no 
relief at all. 
Justice Brandeis' decision in Iowa-Des Moines National 
Bank v. Bennett1SS was, ironically, used by Justice Brennan as 
though it supported his analysis in Heckler v. Mathews. 1s6 Ben­
nett involved a mandamus action in the state courts of Iowa to 
compel a refund of taxes paid by out-of-state banks. The banks 
claimed that the taxes violated the equal protection clause of 
the fourteenth amendment because they were assessed at a rate 
substantially higher than that paid by competing domestic cor­
porations. 1s7 Although they prevailed on the merits, the banks 
were denied relief by the Supreme Court of Iowa. 1S8 That court 
held that the appropriate remedy was to await action by the 
taxing authorities to collect the taxes now due from the banks' 
competitors, or alternatively, to initiate new proceedings to 
compel such collection. 1s9 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the banks were 
constitutionally entitled to the refund they sought.160 Justice 
Brandeis' opinion began by noting that the simple unconstitu­
tionality of the injury suffered by the banks could be remedied 
simply by collecting additional taxes from their competitors: 
"By such collection, the petitioners' grievances would have 
been redressed; for these are not primarily overassessment. The 
right invoked is that to equal treatment; and such treatment will 
1S3 Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931). 

IS4 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 

ISS 284 U.S. 239 (1931). 

IS6 104 S. Ct. 1387, 1395 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes 

107-08. 
157 Iowa-Des Moines Nat'[ Bank, 284 U.S. at 240. 
IS8 Id. at 242-44. 
159Id. at 243-44. 
160 Id. at 247. 
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be obtained if either their competitors' taxes are increased or 
their own reduced."161 It is this portion of the Bennett decision 
that Justice Brennan cites approvingly in Mathews. 
Remedying the unconstitutionality of the assessment 
scheme at issue in Bennett, however, did not remedy the injury 
itself-the collection of discriminatory taxes. Justice Brandeis 
thus went on to complete the task ofjudicial review by directing 
the appropriate relief: 
A taxpayer who has been subjected to discriminatory 
taxation through the favoring of others in violation of 
federal law, cannot be required himself to assume the 
burden of seeking an increase of the taxes which the 
others should have paid .... Nor may he be remitted 
to the necessity of awaiting such action by the state 
officials upon their own initiative . . . . The petitioners 
are entitled to obtain in these suits refund of the excess 
of taxes exacted from them. 162 
The important distinction between judicial correction of an 
unconstitutional classification and judicial relief for an uncon­
stitutional injury was thus spelled out well in advance of Welsh 
and was applied in a purely civil context, to an injury far less 
severe than a criminal conviction and incarceration. Justice 
Brennan's opinion in Heckler v. Mathews does not refer to this 
concluding portion of Justice Brandeis' opinion for the Court in 
Bennett. 
Orr163The standing discussion in Orr v. underscores the 
notion that the constitutional injury requiring a remedy is the 
denial of the benefit (or infliction of the burden) caused by an 
underinclusive classification. As a standing decision, Orr has 
little importance, merely applying the standards for interpreting 
the "case or controversy"l64 requirement of article III developed 
by the Court in the mid and late 1970's. Under these standards, 
a litigant seeking to challenge the constitutionality of govern­
161 [d. 
162 [d. See also, Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 306-07. 

16) 440 u.s. 268 (1979). 

164 [d. at 271-73. 
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ment action must show that the action of which she complains 
causes a "distinct and palpable injury"165 which "is likely to be 
redressed by a favorable decision. "166 This requirement is in­
tended to ensure that a party who seeks the aid of a federal 
court "stand[s] to profit in some personal interest, else the ex­
ercise of judicial power would be gratuitous."167 
Against this backdrop, Orr v. Orr concerned a challenge by 
a divorcing husband to the constitutionality of an Alabama stat­
ute which required him to pay alimony to his wife, but did not 
require identically situated divorcing wives to pay alimony to 
their husbands. 168 Justice Rehnquist, joined in dissent by Chief 
Justice Burger, would have dismissed Orr's appeal for lack of 
standing. Justice Rehnquist's opinion rested on the proposition 
that "in order to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article 
III standing, a party claiming that a statute unconstitutionally 
withholds a particular benefit must be in line to receive the 
benefit if the suit is successful." 169 In Justice Rehnquist's view, 
Mr. Orr could not meet this requirement because he would not 
"benefit from a sex-neutral alimony statute."170 Justice Rehn­
quist's conclusion assumed that such a statute would extend 
alimony obligations to divorcing wives rather than repeal them 
entirely; but his larger point-that standing turns on the exis­
tence of a tangible injury redressable by a tangible remedy­
flows directly from the Court's previous standing decisions. 
Moreover, it rests on the same account developed by Justice 
Brandies in Bennett, and by Justice Harlan in Welsh, of the 
nature of, and remedy for, the injury caused by an underinclu­
sive classification. For Justice Rehnquist, the injury suffered by 
Mr. Orr was the court order requiring him to pay alimony, and 
the only proper remedy for that injury (as opposed to a remedy 
165 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 
166 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 
(1976); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 
U.S. 59, 72 (1978)(to satisfy the constitutional requirement of standing, a party 
must have suffered "injury in fact" which can be redressed by the court's 
remedial powers). 
167 Simon, 426 U.S. at 39. 

168 Orr, 440 U.S. at 271. 

169 !d. at 293 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 

17°Id. at 295. 
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for the underlying unconstitutional inequality) was an order from 
a higher court relieving him of that obligation. 
The majority in Orr, speaking through Justice Brennan, held 
that Mr. Orr did have standing to challenge the Alabama alimony 
c1assification. I7l Justice Brennan's approach to the issue, how­
ever, did not differ in any important way from that of Justice 
Rehnquist. In Justice Brennan's view, Justice Rehnquist's an­
ticipation of the relief question unnecessarily put the cart before 
the horse. Justice Brennan conceded that ifalimony obligations 
were extended to wives, Mr. Orr would gain nothing from his 
lawsuit. 172 This possibility, though, could not serve as a basis 
for holding that he had no standing to sue. It was also possible 
that Orr's constitutional challenge could relieve him of his ali­
mony obligations, since the remedial issue would arise only after 
the statute was declared unconstitutional. 173 Justice Brennan 
thus concluded: "[U]nless we are to hold that underinclusive 
statutes can never be challenged because any plaintiff s success 
can theoretically be thwarted, Mr. Orr must be held to have 
standing here. . . . [H]is constitutional attack holds the only 
promise of escape from the burden that derives from the chal­
171 Orr, 440 u.s. at 271-73. 

172 Justice Brennan also acknowledged that Mr. Orr might enjoy some 

tangible relief if alimony responsibilities were imposed on divorcing wives: 
Even if Alabama chooses to burden both men and women with 
alimony requirements in appropriate circumstances, Mr. Orr argues 
that a gender-neutral statute would result in lower payments on his 
part. He argues that the current statutes award alimony to wives 
based not solely upon need or comparative financial circumstances, 
but also upon gender related factors, e.g., the State's view that a 
man must maintain his wife in the manner to which she has been 
accustomed .... He also argues that alimony agreements are not 
automatically incorporated into court decrees, but rather are usu­
ally first reviewed as to their fairness to the wife but not to the 
husband .... 
[d. at 273, 274 n.3. Justice Brennan's reference to these possibilities under­
scores, of course, the point urged in the text: For a unanimous Orr court, 
constitutional injuries lie not in the abstract wrong of unequal treatment, but 
in the concrete denial of tangible benefits (or imposition of tangible burdens). 
173 [d. at 272. 
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lenged statutes. "174 For the Brennan majority no less than for 
Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger in dissent, the injury 
suffered by Mr. Orr as a result of Alabama's underinclusive 
alimony scheme was the obligation to make payments to his 
estranged wife. The remedy for this injury was not to impose 
this burden on others (though this would plainly correct the 
unconstitutionality of the underlying classification) but to relieve 
Mr. Orr of its weight. 
Orr thus confirms the premises of Justice Harlan's Welsh 
concurrence: (1) that the injury inflicted by an unconstitutionally 
underinclusive classification is not the abstract wrong ofunequal 
treatment, but the concrete denial of the benefit it authorizes, 
or imposition of the burden it inflicts; and (2) that extension of 
the burden or nullification of the benefit created by an under­
inclusive classification affords no remedy to those injured by it. 
Under these premises, contrary to Justice Brennan's analysis in 
Heckler v. Mathews, the pension offset exception severability 
clause precludes the award of a constitutionally sufficient rem­
edy to persons injured by the offset exception. Incorporating 
the more fundamental proposition developed above, that article 
III judicial review and the nature of constitutional rights them­
selves require adequate relief for a person suffering from an 
unconstitutional injury, leads to the conclusion that the sever­
ability clause is unconstitutional. The possible relevance of the 
analysis of constitutional injuries in Orr v. Orr receives no men­
tion in Justice Brennan's opinion in Heckler v. Mathews. 
Justice Brennan suggests, however, that a number of other 
decisions support his conclusion that the injury caused by the 
pension offset exception is the perpetuation of '''archaic and 
stereotypic' notions" or the imposition of stigma on a class.175 
An examination of these decisions, however, reveals that the 
injuries claimed by the challenging plaintiffs (and remedied by 
the Court) included harms more tangible than any stigmatization 
caused by the classification at issue. Where judicial relief has 
been limited to the eradication of stigma alone, the classification 
triggering the relief has been found constitutionally deficient 
174 [d. at 272-73 (emphasis by Justice Brennan). 
175 Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. at 1395. 
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because it is improperly overinclusive, rather than underinclu­
sive. 176 Unconstitutional overinclusiveness raises different re­
medial issues from those posed by underinclusiveness. These 
issues are susceptible of resolution by awards of relief directed 
solely at the eradication of such intangible harms as govern­
mentally inflicted stigma or role-typing. 
Justice Brennan,' hegins with Mississippi University for 
Women v. HoganY7 Hogan, however, underscores the impor­
tance of tangible judicial relief for tangible injuries caused by 
the denial of equal treatment. Joe Hogan was denied admission 
to the baccalaureate nursing program at the Mississippi Univer­
sity for Women (MUW) solely because of his sex. The state of 
Mississippi offered co-educational baccalaureate nursing pro­
grams, for which Hogan presumably could have qualified, at 
two other campuses, but Jfogan lived and worked in Columbus, 
Mississippi, where MUW was located. As Justice Powell 
pointed out in dissent, the injury suffered by Joe Hogan was 
the inconvenience, and expense of being required to travel to 
the state-supported nursing schools that were open to him, a 
burden not imposed on similarly situated women. 178 For Justice 
Powell, this injury bore no relationship whatever to the "sex­
stereotyping" reasoning upon which the Court majority rested 
its judgment that the refusal to admit Hogan to MUW was 
unconstitutional. 179 
One need not accept Justice Powell's assessment of the 
connection between stereotyping and Hogan's injury in order 
to agree with his characterization of the harm which brought 
about his suit (and which the success of that suit remedied). 
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the court held that MUW's pol­
icy of excluding males from admission to its school of nursing 
tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as 
an exclusively woman's job. By assuring that Missis­
sippi allots more openings in its state-supported nursing 
176 See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 183-98. 
In 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
178 !d. at 736 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
179 [d. 
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schools to women than it does to men, MUW's admis­
sions policy lends credibility to the old view that 
women, not men, should become nurses, and makes 
the assumption that nursing is a field for women a self­
fulfilling prophecy. 180 
This role-typing, however, was not the injury suffered by Joe 
Hogan, but was rather the reason why the injury he did suffer 
(denial of admission to MUW's nursing school) demanded a 
remedy. 
The other decisions relied on by Justice Brennan in foot­
notes are in much the same vein. 181 The injuries for which 
180 Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 729-30 (footnote omitted). 
181 The following cases were cited by Justice Brennan as suppporting the 
proposition that the infliction of stigma alone constitutes a constitutional injury 
that can be relieved by an end to preferential treatment for others: Bob Jones 
Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983)(sustaining denial of tax-exempt 
status to racially discriminatory schools on ground that pervasive influence of 
discriminatory treatment on educational process is contrary to public policy); 
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)(sustaining standing of 
black "tester" to seek statutory relief from discriminatory housing practices 
on basis of defendant's withholding of truthful information concerning housing 
availability); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) 
(sustaining standing of village and its residents to seek statutory relief from 
housing discrimination on basis of damage to property values and loss of social 
and professional benefits of integration caused by racial steering); Gilmore v. 
City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974)(sustaining injunction against city's 
exclusive grant of access to parks and recreational facilities to segregated 
organizations); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)(plurality opinion 
granting dependent's benefits to married woman Air Force officer on same 
basis as similarly situated male officer on ground that statute denying such 
benefits unconstitutionally discriminated on account of sex); Trafficante v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972)(sustaining standing of tenants 
to seek statutory relief from housing discrimination by landlord on ground that 
such discrimination deprived them of social and professional benefits of inte­
gration and caused economic damage as well as "stigmatization"); Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (denying standing of conservation organization 
to challenge national forest development, but noting that injuries to aesthetic 
and environmental well-being could lay the basis for standing); Griffin v. 
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964)(sustaining injunction against county 
aid to private segregated schools and directing district court to consider or­
dering reopening of public schools in order to vindicate plaintiffs' constitu­
tional right to a desegregated public education); Brown v. Board of Educ., 
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judicial relief was sought were tangible, if sometimes non-eco­
nomic, and the remedy granted redressed the injuries claimed. 
Where the remedy was limited to directing "an end to prefer­
ential treatment for others,"182 that remedy nevertheless had the 
purpose and effect of relieving an injury beyond any stigma or 
stereotyping inflicted by the existence of such treatment. 
The only case that approaches Justice Brennan's para­
digm-that the only injury inflicted by a denial of equal treat­
347 U.S. 483 (1954)(ordering desegregation of public schools on ground that 
separation of children on basis of race denied black children equal educational 
opportunity, even though physical facilities and other tangible factors were 
equal); Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. at 1395 nn. 7, 8. 
Justice Brennan also referred to Justice Powell's separate opinion in 
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 93-96 (1979)(discussed supra text accom­
panying notes 27-56) and to Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 
(1973)(discussed infra text accompanying notes 183-98). Mathews, 104 S. Ct. 
at 1395 nn.7, 8. 
In the text of his opinion in Mathews, Justice Brennan further contended 
that the Court has "frequently entertained attacks on discriminatory statutes 
or practices even when the government could deprive a successful plaintiff of 
any monetary relief by withdrawing the statute's benefits from both the favored 
and the excluded class." !d. at 1395. In support of this proposition he cited 
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 
U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Kahn v. Shevin, 
416 U.S. 351 (1974); and Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). The conclusion 
drawn from these cases by Justice Brennan is discussed infra notes 259-63 
and accompanying text. 
A decision not mentioned by Justice Brennan but which might appear to 
support his reasoning in Heckler v. Mathews is Taxation with Representation 
v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 742-44 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 103 
S. Ct. 1997 (1983). In Regan, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit held that statutory preferential treatment oflobbying by tax­
exempt veterans organizations violated the equal protection rights of other 
tax-exempt organizations and then remanded the issue ofrelief to the district 
court. Nullification of the preference (had it been ordered) might appear to be 
an example of compensating "the victims of a discriminatory government 
program ... by an end to preferential treatment for others." Heckler v. 
Matpews, 104 S. Ct. at 1395 n.8. The injury suffered by the disfavored orga­
nizations encompassed more, however, than just the loss of the economic 
value of tax-exemption. It also included denial ofaccess to the political process 
as compared to the veterans organizations, an injury to which nullification of 
the veterans organizations' advantage would be responsive. Regan, 676 F.2d 
at 721-22. The relief issue in Regan was, however, rendered moot by the 
Supreme Court's reversal on the merits of the decision of the court of appeals. 
182 Mathews, 104 S. Ct. at 1395 n.8. 
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ment is the ascription of stigma, which may be removed by 
ending benefits to others-is Norwood v. Harrison. 183 The per­
suasive force of this decision was, as will be seen, seriously 
undermined by the Supreme Court's (post-Mathews) standing 
decision in Allen v. Wright. l84 The plaintiffs in Norwood were 
black parents from Mississippi whose children were parties to 
a school desegregation order. They sought an injunction against 
the use of Mississippi's private school textbook lending program 
to provide textbooks to students attending schools which ex­
cluded pupils on the basis of race. The parents alleged that 
supplying textbooks to these students amounted to direct, un­
constitutional state aid to racially segregated education. They 
further claimed that the textbook aid program impeded the pro­
cess of fully desegregating Mississippi's public schools in vio­
lation of their children's constitutional rights. The Supreme 
Court sustained both claims and directed the federal district 
court in Mississippi to issue an injunction withdrawing textbook 
aid from discriminatory private schools.18s 
The Court's opinion, by Chief Justice Burger, did not dis­
cuss the nature of the injury suffered by the challenging parents 
and children. The opinion noted, however, that a state may not 
"grant the type of tangible financial aid here involved if that aid 
has a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce and support 
private discrimination. "186 At the same time, the Chief Justice 
accepted the district court's factual finding that there had been 
no showing that "any child enrolled in private school, ifdeprived 
of free textbooks, would withdraw from private school and 
subsequently enroll in the public schools."187 The Court thus 
could not "know . . . whether state textbook assistance is the 
determinative factor in the enrollment of any students in any of 
the private schools in Mississippi. "188 These findings arguably 
undermined the challenging parents' claim that the textbook 
18) 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 

184 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984). 

18S Norwood, 413 U.S. at 461-71. 

186Id. at 466. 

187/d. at 465 (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 

(N.D. Miss. 1972)). 
188Id. 
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program impeded their children's right to a desegregated edu­
cation, implying that the only injury suffered by the Norwood 
parents was the stigmatic denigration of their race by govern­
mental support of racial discrimination. This injury could be 
redressed by denial of participation in the textbook program to 
discriminatory schools. Even understood in this way however, 
Norwood does not support Justice Brennan's approach in Heck­
ler v. Mathews. One reason is the Court's decision in Allen v. 
Wright, and another more important reason lies in the differ­
ence between overinclusive and underinclusive legislative 
classifications. 
The plaintiffs in Allen v. Wright were a national class of 
parents of black public school children enrolled in school dis­
tricts undergoing desegregation. They sought to enforce the 
obligation of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to avoid aiding 
private schools that practice racial discrimination by granting 
such schools tax-exempt status. In holding that the plaintiffs did 
not have standing to sue, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the 
Court specifically denied that a claim of stigmatic injury alone 
could provide the basis for standing.189 Rather, resting chiefly 
on Heckler v. Mathews, Justice O'Connor found that the inflic­
tion of stigma "accords a basis for standing only to 'those per­
sons who are personally denied equal treatment' by the chal­
lenged discriminatory conduct."190 On this reasoning, the 
189 Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3327. 
190 [d. (quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. at 1395 (1984»(emphasis 
supplied). The stigmatic injury suffered by the Mathews class was personal 
because of the presence of a "concrete interest with respect to which [they 
were] personally subject to discriminatory treatment." [d. at 3328 n.22. That 
interest was the Mathews class' claim for Social Security benefits. For standing 
purposes, then, the distinction between Wright and Mathews appears to be 
that while the Wright plaintiffs were found to suffer only stigmatic injury, 
which is not judicially cognizable, the Mathews plaintiffs were found to suffer 
stigmatic injury plus the deprivation of a concrete interest, which is judicially 
cognizable. If this is indeed why Wright and Mathews are different, it is 
reasonable to ask why the full injury which affords the basis for standing in 
Mathews, stigmatic harm plus the denial of Social Security benefits would 
not, ifunconstitutionally inflicted, require a correspondingly full, constitution­
ally sufficient remedy. In short, Justice O'Connor's attempt to rely on Heckler 
v. Mathews to defeat standing in Allen v. Wright reveals the artificial narrow­
ness of Justice Brennan's articulation of the injury at issue in Mathews. 
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"abstract" stigmatic injury at issue in Wright and, according to 
the reading offered above, in Norwood as well, is not judicially 
cognizable. 191 
Justice O'Connor's Wright opinion did not purport to over­
rule Norwood v. Harrison, but rather distinguished Norwood 
on the ground that the plaintiffs there were parties to a specific 
school desegregation order. Through the desegregation decree, 
they had acquired a personal interest in requiring the state of 
Mississippi to avoid perpetuation of the racially dual school 
system it had sponsored. An analogous personal interest was, 
for Justice O'Connor, absent in Wright since the Wright plain­
tiffs sought relief against the IRS, not against a state school 
system subject to a pre-existing injunctive decree. 192 
This attempt to distinguish Norwood may well be strained. 
It certainly did not persuade the Wright dissenters, who thought 
Norwood required a finding that the Wright plaintiffs did have 
standing to sue. 193 But even if Norwood has not been effectively 
overruled by Allen v. Wright, it survives in a form that provides 
no support for Justice Brennan's opinion in Heckler v. Ma­
thews. 194 As interpreted by Justice O'Connor, the injury reme­
died by the Court in Norwood was not naked racial denigration, 
but interference with the concrete interest of the plaintiffs' chil­
dren in a desegregated public education. 
One need not embrace Justice O'Connor's standing analysis 
in Allen v. Wright to reject Justice Brennan's approach in Heck­
191 ld. at 3227. 
1921d. at 3331. This distinction also provided a basis for Justice O'Con­
nor's rejection of the Wright plaintiffs' alternative standing argument-that 
the IRS grant of tax-exemption to racist schools impaired their children's right 
to a desegregated public education. Justice O'Connor found that this alleged 
injury was not (as it purportedly was in Nonvood) "fairly traceable" to the 
challenged government conduct. ld. at 3328-31. 
193 Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3336, 3338-9, 3341 (Brennan, J., dissenting); [d. 
at 3344,3347 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
194 It may be more accurate to describe Heckler v. Mathews as undermin­
ing the basis for Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Allen v. Wright 
by suggesting that infliction of stigma alone presents a judicially cognizable 
injury. This is perhaps the reason that Justice O'Connor takes such pains to 
redefine the injury at issue in Mathews to include deprivation of a concrete 
interest beyond stigmatization. See supra note 190. 
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ler v. Mathews. Wright could have been decided in favor of the 
challenging plaintiffs with standing predicated on stigmatic racial 
denigration alone, without suggesting either that the injury in 
Mathews was gender denigration, or that the proper remedy 
there was eradication of the stigma through denial of benefits to 
others. Among the many differences between the cases, perhaps 
the most significant is that in Allen v. Wright (and Norwood v. 
Harrison), the classification at issue was challenged on the 
ground that it was improperly overinclusive, while in Heckler 
v. Mathews the challenge was based on a claim of unconstitu­
tional underinclusiveness. 
An overinclusive classification is one which is unconstitu­
tional because it treats similarly groups which ought to be 
treated differently. In the case of an overinclusive burden (e.g., 
a statute which punishes shoplifters and murderers alike by 
death), the injury is the imposition of the burden, and the rem­
edy is relief from that burden. The result of a convicted shop­
lifter's successful challenge to this hypothetical statute would 
be avoidance of the death penalty. 
A classification which confers a benefit on an inappro­
priately overinclusive class presents a different remedial prob­
lem. In Norwood, none of the plaintiffs claimed to have been 
improperly denied the benefit of Mississippi's school textbook 
program. The constitutional flaw in the program was that it 
included schools which practiced racial discrimination among 
those who could receive that benefit. Leaving aside Justice 
O'Connor's revision in Allen v. Wright, the injury caused by 
this improper inclusion was the inherent racial insult in granting 
this benefit. If state aid to discriminatory schools necessarily 
inflicts unconstitutional injury on black parents and children, 
certainly a court-ordered cessation of the aid affords a consti­
tutionally adequate remedy for that injury. 
This approach to the remedy problem will not suffice if the 
injury is caused by an unconstitutionally underinclusive classi­
fication, that is, one which treats differently groups which ought 
to be treated the same. Elliott Welsh, for example, suffered no 
injury from Congress' decision to exempt religiously motivated 
conscientious objectors from military service. The grant of ex­
emption itself denied him nothing of tangible value, nor did it 
inflict intangible harm of the sort leveled against black parents 
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and children by the Mississippi textbook program at issue in 
Norwood. Unlike the Norwood plaintiffs, Elliott Welsh's con­
stitutional injury would have evaporated only if he had been 
extended the benefit provided to others. The injury lay in the 
denial of his application for conscientious objector status and in 
his sentence to a term in federal prison for refusing induction 
into the military service. Unlike the injuries at issue in Norwood, 
these harms cannot be remedied by withdrawing benefits that 
have been granted to others. 
Heckler v. Mathews is directly analogous to Welsh v. 
United States, 195 not to Norwood v. Harrison or Allen v. Wright. 
195 398 U.S. 333 (1970). It may be objected that it is inaccurate to describe 
Welsh's injury as being of the same character as the injury suffered by the 
Mathews class. The constitutional norm violated in Welsh was, by Justice 
Harlan's hypothesis, the prohibition against the establishment of religion; in 
Mathews it was the equal protection guarantee. According to this objection, 
every equal protection violation necessarily inflicts the injury of stigmatization 
over and above any other more particular, tangible harms it might cause. 
Transgressions of the establishment clause, on the other hand, do not inher­
ently stigmatize anyone. As Justice O'Connor recently emphasized, however, 
a principal purpose of the establishment prohibition is to prevent government 
endorsement of religion. "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that 
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an ac­
companying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of 
the political community." Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 (1984) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Such stigmatization of "non-adherents" is indis­
tinguishable from the labeling as "less worthy participants in the political 
community" found by Justice Brennan's Mathews opinion to be the evil 
inherent in discrimination prohibited by the equal protection guarantee. Heck­
ler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. at 1395. The distinction between Welsh and Ma­
thews is rather that in the establishment clause context, this evil alone has 
never been held to constitute a constitutional injury sufficient to confer stand­
ing to sue on a recipient of the allegedly stigmatic message. See, e.g., Valley 
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, 454 U.S. 464,483-85 (1982). 
On a more practical level, the best test for the presence of stigma as an 
independent injury is whether persons supposedly suffering from the stigma 
will sue to relieve it when the available relief is limited to the withdrawal of 
a benefit from, or infliction of a burden on, someone else. In Califano v. 
Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979), like Mathews an equal protection case, there is 
little reason to think that working women would have brought suit simply to 
deprive families of working men of AFDC benefits, despite the undeniable 
presence of stigmatizing reasons for the exclusion of these families from the 
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Robert Mathews and his class were not injured, stigmatically or 
otherwise, by Congress' award of an exemption from the pen­
sion offset against Social Security benefits to women with iden­
tical work histories. They were injured, rather, by Congress' 
failure to provide a similar exemption to them. Nullification of 
the exemption provides no relief from this injury. 
The distinction between overinclusive and underinclusive 
classifications suggested by a comparison of Norwood and 
Wright on the one hand, with Welsh and Jpfathews on the other, 
underscores the practical threat to effective exercise of article 
III judicial power presented by Justice Brennan's opinion for 
the Court in Mathews. More than two decades ago, Brennan 
himself reminded us that "[a] federal court cannot 'pronounce 
any statute, either of a State or of the United States, void, 
because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is 
called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual 
controversies. '''196 This standing requirement, Brennan pointed 
out, forced the challengers of a statute to allege "such a personal 
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that con­
crete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues 
upon which the Court so largely depends for illumination of 
difficult constitutional questions. "197 
By approving the remedy of anticipatory nullification for 
unconstitutionally underinclusive classifications, Justice Bren­
nan's Mathews opinion authorizes Congress preemptively to 
remove that "concrete adverseness"198 from a broad class of 
challenges to its work product. 199 Again the litigation postures 
AFDC-UF program. See supra text accompanying notes 24-56; see also infra 
text accompanying note 199. 
196 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)(quoting Liverpool Steamship 
" Co. v. Commissioners of Emigrati.on, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885». 
197 [d. 
198 [d. 
199 Similarly, the Court's decision in Allen v. Wright may well have in­
sulated overinclusive classifications which cause unconstitutional stigmatic 
injuries from judicial review, save in the limited instances where taxpayer 
standing is available. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United 
for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 489-90 n.26 (1982). But see 
also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)(granting taxpayer standing to challenge 
the constitutionality of federal funding of religious and sectarian schools' 
purchase of educational materials). 
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of the Norwood parents and Elliott Welsh may be contrasted. 
If the remedy for the unconstitutional inclusion of racially dis­
criminatory schools in Mississippi's textbook program is a de­
cree withdrawing the benefits of the program from offending 
schools, will the Norwood parents file a lawsuit challenging the 
overinclusive classification? They will, because the remedy is 
directly responsive to the harm they suffer, i.e., the racial de­
nigration inherent in governmental aid to the educational pro­
grams of racist schools. On the other hand, if the remedy for 
the failure to allow an exemption from military service for sec­
ular conscientious objectors is a decree withdrawing the exemp­
tion from religious objectors, will Elliott Welsh seek judicial 
relief from Congress' underinclusive classification? He probably 
will not. Few, if any, persons in his situation will feel a "personal 
stake" in the prospect of causing others to forfeit the benefit of 
objector status. 
Just as it would be erroneous to assert that Welsh's injury 
consisted of stigmatization, Justice Brennan's characterization 
of the injury suffered by the challengers in the analogous case 
of Heckler v. Mathews as stigmatization or stereotyping is 
plainly a fiction, albeit a convenient one. Its creation permitted 
the Supreme Court to avoid facing a collision with Congress 
over the power to fashion constitutional remedies. The argument 
in this Article implies that this collision is unavoidable. The 
question, then, is how to resolve it. 
3. 	The Remedial Responsibilities ofLegislatures and 
Courts 
The foregoing criticism of the remedial analysis in Heckler 
v. Mathews suggests a number of conclusions about the consti­
tutional responsibilities of legislatures and courts in providing 
remedies for underinclusive classifications. Initially (and not­
withstanding the examples provided by Orr, Welsh, and Ben
nett), the argument does not require that an enacting legislature 
invariably provide for the extension of the benefit (or nullifica­
tion of the burden) created by an underinclusive classification 
in the event that classification is held unconstitutional. For in­
stance, Congress could have authorized a damage remedy to 
compensate recipients for the loss of expected Social Security 
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benefits. Alternatively, Congress might have ordered restitution 
of a portion of the Social Security taxes paid by (or on behalf 
of) the spouses of these recipients. The doctrinal premises es­
tablish only that a legislature is obligated to afford an adequate 
remedy for unconstitutional underinc1usiveness, and that nulli­
fication alone (in the case of an underinc1usive benefit) does not 
satisfy the obligation.20o The lesson of the Court's Bivens line 
of decisions is not that the best possible remedy must be made 
available to victims of unconstitutional government action, oniy 
that some constitutionally adequate form of relief be provided. 
In contrast, a reviewing court faced with a legislative failure 
to meet its remedial obligations probably has a limited number 
of options. In theory, a court asked to repair the harm caused 
by an unconstitutionally underinc1usive statute must (under Biv­
ens and its progeny) provide a constitutionally sufficient (also 
not necessarily the best) remedy. In the absence of legislative 
authorization, however, constitutionally adequate remedies 
other than extension (in the case of a benefit) or nullification (in 
the case of a burden) may be difficult to frame. In the case of 
the pension offset exception, for example, sovereign immunity 
would almost certainly bar ajudicially imposed damages remedy 
against the United States.201 
A damages remedy against the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services and/or Social Security Administration officials 
charged with administering the statute would not, as Bivens 
200 Professor Sager has underscored both the centrality of Congress' duty 
to afford adequate remedies for injuries to constitutional rights and the diffi­
culty of ascertaining, in particular instances, whether that duty has been met: 
To be sure, measuring the effectiveness of remedies for constitu­
tional wrongs is not an easy or uncontroversial business. And our 
legal tradition cedes to Congress considerable discretion in select­
ing among remedial mechanisms. But where constitutional rights 
are at stake and where Congress leaves the federal courts with 
authority to grant only plainly inadequate relief, it has set itself 
against the Constitution. 
Sager, supra note 144, at 88. 
201 United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399-407 (1976); Larson v. 
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). 
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shows, present sovereign immunity problems, but would none­
theless fail in the face of the secretary's legitimate claim that in 
implementing the offset (and its exception), she was simply 
carrying out a constitutional obligation to execute the laws en­
acted by Congress.202 Consequently, if in Heckler v. Mathews 
the Supreme Court had found the offset exception to be discrim­
inatory on account of sex and therefore unconstitutionally un­
derinclusive, the argument advanced here suggests that the only 
appropriate remedy would have been an extension of the benefit 
of the exception to the Mathews class. 
B. The Severability Clause as an Impermissible Curtailment 
ofArticle·III lurisidiction 
This Article has argued that Justice Brennan's opinion for 
the Court in Heckler v. Mathews wrongly identified the injury 
caused by the pension offset exception of the 1977 Social Se­
curity amendments as the infliction of stigma or the perpetuation 
of "archaic and stereotypic"203 notions. Though gender stigma­
tization may well have influenced the enactment ofthe exception 
(an influence which should have weighed heavily against its 
constitutionality), the injury it caused was the denial of Social 
Security benefits to those men from whom the exception was 
withheld on account of their sex. The severability clause which 
accompanies the pension offset exception plainly precludes the 
award ofjudicial relief from this injury. Thus, the further impact 
of the severability clause is to withdraw the standing of Robert 
Mathews and the class he represents to challenge the constitu­
tionality of the pension offset exception. Such a legislative with­
drawal of standing constitutes, as Judge Guin pointed out, an 
impermissible use of the exceptions clause of article III of the 
202 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)(affording qualified im­
munity from damage liability for official acts to federal executive branch 
officials acting in good faith and with reasonable grounds for their belief); 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)(affording qualified, variable immunity 
for official acts to state executive branch officials who act reasonably and with 
a good faith belief in light of all the circumstances). See also supra note 144. 
203 Mathews, 104 S. Ct. at 1395. 
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Constitution to preclude federal judicial review of an arguably 
unconstitutional statute.204 
Justice Brennan's opinion in Heckler v. Mathews concedes 
that the challengers' standing to sue depends on the availability 
of a constitutionally adequate remedy for the injury they suf­
fer.205 Brennan parts company with the Court's previous stand­
ing decisions only in his disregard of the teaching of Orr v. Orr206 
that the injury caused by an underinclusive classification is the 
concrete denial of the benefit it authorizes. Only through this 
unexplained abandonment of Orr can he escape the conclusion 
that the severability clause immunizes the pension offset excep­
tion from judicial review-not only in the practical sense that 
no one has a tangible interest in challenging it, but also in the 
theoretical sense that no one has standing to undertake such a 
challenge. 
Justice Brennan properly notes that standing to sue is a 
prerequisite to the assertion of jurisdiction over a claim by an 
article III court.207 If the severability clause deprives persons 
who suffer injury from unconstitutional government action of 
standing to challenge that action, it thereby deprives all federal 
courts ofjurisdiction to hear and decide the constitutional claims 
of these persons. Although the point has never been finally 
settled by the Supreme Court208 and is explicitly avoided in 
Mathews, Professors Sager,209 Eisenberg,210 and Rotunda211 each 
have argued that the "exceptions" clause of article 1II212 cannot 
be employed to frustrate the exercise of judicial review in this 
204 Mathews v. Heckler, 1982 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH), 1114,313, at 2405, 
2408 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984). 
205 Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S. Ct. at 1394. 
206 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
207 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
208 See e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366 (1974). But see Ex 
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). 
209 Sager, supra note 144. 
210 Eisenberg, supra note 122. 
2ll See Rotunda, Congressional Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the 
Lower Federal Courts and the Problem of School Busing, 64 Geo. L.J. 839, 
846-47 (1976). 
212 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, 112. 
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manner. While their arguments need not be repeated here, it 
may be noted that they all rest on the principle urged in the 
discussion of constitutional remedies above,213 that the basic 
"plan" of the Constitution214 and the effective execution of the 
judicial power granted by article III entail the availability of 
federal judicial review to persons claiming injury from uncon­
stitutional acts of government.2lS 
Even if the severability clause is not seen as a congressional 
withdrawal of article III jurisdiction, it has been well established 
since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Klein216 
more than a century ago that Congress may not formally permit 
the assumption of jurisdiction over a constitutional claim only 
to hamstring the exercise of judicial review by seeking to direct 
the resolution of that claim.217 In Klein, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a statute purporting to withdraw jurisdiction from 
the court of claims and, on appeal, from the Supreme Court, 
over certain cases seeking indemnification for property confis­
cated during the Civil War. The attempted curtailment of juris­
diction was conditional, triggered only by a finding in either 
court that the claim was based upon the claimant's receipt of a 
presidential pardon for having participated in the war on the 
side of the Confederacy. Because of its conditional nature, the 
statute could not be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the 
"exceptions" power. It was rather "a means to an end," designed 
to direct the courts to deny effect to a presidential pardon in 
precisely those indemnification cases which depended on such 
213 See supra text accompanying notes 116-45. 
214 Hart, supra note 122, at 1365. 
21S Recall that the district judge in Mathews v. Heckler invalidated the 
Social Security Pension Offset Severability Clause as an improper attempt to 
curtail article III jurisdiction over constitutional claims. Mathews v. Heckler, 
1982 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1114,313 at 2405, 2408 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 
1982) rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes 95­
100; see a/so, Caloger v. Harris, 1981 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1117,754 (D. 
Md. Mar. 25, 1981) (dismissing challenge to constitutionality of pension offset 
exception for lack of standing); Ginsburg, supra note 12 at 317 n.103 (sug­
gesting that standing and case or controversy requirements are met only if a 
constitutional claim offers a challenger the prospect of the remedy he seeks). 
216 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). 
217Id. at 145. See also Sager, supra note 144, at 70-77. 
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a pardon.21S Such a direction improperly intruded on the exercise 
of article III judicial power. 219 
By forbidding federal courts from granting a remedy to 
persons injured by the underinclusiveness of the offset excep­
tion, the Mathews severability clause may run afoul of the prin­
ciple of judicial independence articulated in Klein. That is, the 
clause may improperly encourage reviewing courts to uphold 
the pension offset exception against constitutional attack. Recall 
the uncertain (but plainly unappealing) consequences posecl by 
a judgment that the exception is unconstitutional if the severa­
bility clause is then given effect.220 Benefits will be cut, reliance 
interests will be disregarded, the living standard of people in 
need will be eroded. Retrospective recoupment of previously 
paid benefits may ensue. Satellite litigation over the scope of 
this negative relief will almost certainly commence. None of this 
amounts to an explicit directive from Congress to a reviewing 
court to sustain the constitutionality of the pension offset ex­
ception. Still, in a close case, these consequences might under­
standably influence a conscientious judge who is not impervious 
to the human impact of her decisions. Heckler v. Mathews was 
not a close case, but one can only speculate whether it might 
have been closer in the absence of the long shadow Gast on the 
Court's remedial power by the severability clause. Seen in this 
light, it may not matter whether the clause amounts to a formal 
curtailment of federal jurisdiction, for its predictable effects 
may, in any event, conflict with the Klein principle.221 
The inability of Congress to render unconstitutional injuries 
non-justiciable was also the basis of the Supreme Court's deci­
sion in United States v. Lovett.222 Lovett concerned an appro­
priations act rider223 which specifically prohibited payment of 
218 Klein, 80 U.S. at 145. 
219 Id.. at 146-48. 
220 See supra text accompanying notes 89-93. 
221 See Mathews v. Heckler, 1982 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,313 at 
2408 (suggesting that by enacting the Social Security Pension Offset Exception 
Severability Clause, "Congress attempted to mandate the outcome of any 
challenge to the validity of the exception by making such a challenge 
fruitless.") . 
222328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
223 Act of July 12, 1943, ch. 218, § 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450. 
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the salaries of three named government employees found by 
Congress to have engaged in "subversive activities. "224 The 
three employees successfully challenged the prohibition on a 
number of constitutional grounds in a suit for compensation 
filed in the Court of Claims.225 On appeal, the special counsel 
appointed to represent the Congress argued that as an appro­
priation measure the restriction lay within Congress' exclusive 
power under Article I, § 9 cl. 7 of the Constitution.226 For this 
reason, the argument continued, the employees' challenge to its 
constitutionality did not present a justiciable issue.227 The Su­
preme Court, speaking through Justice Black, rejected the ar­
gument, noting that the purpose and effect of the prohibition 
was to bar the employees from government employment.228 Such 
a bar plainly "stigmatized their reputation and seriously im­
paired their chance to earn a living. "229 If the employees' suit 
were not justiciable the legality of these injuries 
could never be challenged in any court .... To quote 
Alexander Hamilton: " ... [A] limited Constitution ... 
[is] one which contains certain specified exceptions to 
the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it 
shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, 
and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved 
in practice no other way than through the medium of 
the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare 
all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Consti­
tution void. Without this, all of the reservations of 
particular rights or privileges would amount to noth­
ing." Federalist Paper No. 78.230 
224 Lovett, 328 U.S. at 311. 
225 Id. at 305-06. The employees argued that the restriction showed a 
congressional purpose to exercise the power to remove executive employees, 
a power conferred on the executive branch by article I, §§ 1-4 of the Consti­
tution, that it was a bill of attainder, in violation of article I, § 9, cl. 3 of the 
Constitution, and that it deprived them of liberty and property in violation of 
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 4. 
226 Lovett, 328 U.S. at 306. 
227Id. at 307. 
228 Id. at 313. 
229Id. at 314. 
230 Id. The Lovett decision ought to put to rest the contention, rarely 
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Klein, Lovett, and Federalist 78 are not cited to imply that 
the Constitution requires that someone be afforded standing to 
challenge every instance of its violation, else that violation go 
unreviewed.231 They are not cited for even the more limited 
claim that all violations of the individual rights guaranteed by 
the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment must be sus­
ceptible of judicial correction.232 The point is rather that when 
such violations cause specific persons to suffer "actual or threat­
ened injury, "233 any attempt by Congress to preclude the award 
of a remedy for the injury, and thus to deny these persons 
standing to sue, constitutes an improper exercise of the excep­
tions power of article IIp34 to frustrate the vindication of con­
stitutional rights by rendering them non-justiciable. The Su­
preme Court's failure, in Heckler v. Mathews, to recognize the 
pension offset exception severability clause as just such an at­
tempt sanctions a serious threat to the independent exercise of 
federal judicial power. 
C. The First Amendment Right to Petition the Courts for 

Redress of Grievances 

The chilling impact of the offset exception severability 
clause on the litigation process may violate the constitutional 
advanced since Westcott, that judicial extension of the coverage of a public 
benefit program, even to vindicate constitutional rights, conflicts with Con­
gress' constitutional power over the appropriations process. U.S. Const. art. 
I, § 9, cl. 7. See, e.g., Doe v Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 865, 870-72 (D.N.J. 
1976). At least when the program in issue has been supported by an appro­
priation of general applicability, a conclusion that such an extension is pre­
cluded is "excluded by the nature of constitutional government." McRae v. 
Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 729 (E.D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub 
nom., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See generally, Ginsburg, supra 
note 12, at 303. 
231 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 
208, 227 (1974)(stating that "[t]he assumption that if respondents have no 
standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing."); 
see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
232 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation 
of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 483-84 (1982)(rejecting proposition that 
there is a hierarchy of constitutional values or a "sliding scale" of standing 
that would diminish article III burdens when a personal constitutional right is 
at stake). 
233 Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,99 (1979). 
234 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, ~ 2. 
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rights of persons harmed by the exception in yet another respect 
not addressed by the Supreme Court in Heckler v. Mathews. 
By purporting to prevent the injured class, in advance of liti­
gation, from securing relief from the injury, the clause under­
mines their first amendment right235 to petition the courts for 
redress of grievances. The right to petition "the government for 
a redress of grievances"236 plainly protects the right of access 
to the courts.237 Moreover, in a number of opinions protecting 
the associational interests of attorneys and clients, the Supreme 
Court has underscored the crucial role of the litigation process 
as a form of political expression aimed at vindicating other 
constitutional rights.238 The landmark decision in NAACP v. 
Button,239 for example, stands for the proposition that "litigation 
is not [merely] a technique of resolving private differences; it is 
a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treat­
ment by all government, federal, state and local . . . . "240 
The Court has also made clear that in evaluating claims of 
legislative interference with access to the litigation process, it 
will focus on the legislation's impact on that process rather than 
on the aims of the legislative body which enacted it.241 The 
possibility that the purposes of the severability clause were 
wholly benign would not save it if the clause inhibited the ex­
ercise of first amendment rights. Implicit in this emphasis on 
impact is the notion that the restraint on access to the courts 
need not be direct or formal in order to run afoul of the first 
235 U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 3. 
236Id. 
237 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 
510 (1972); United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 
(1967); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex reI. Virginia State 
Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428, 430 (1963). 
See generally In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978); United Transportation 
Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 580 (1971). 
238 See In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 431-32,438 n.32; United Transportation 
Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415, 430 (1963). 
239 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
24°Id. at 429. 
241 United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n., 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967); 
see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 
308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
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amendment. As the Court noted in United Mine Workers v. 
Illinois, the amendment would "be a hollow promise if it left 
government free to erode its guarantees by indirect restraints 
so long as no law is passed that prohibits free speech, press, 
petition, or assembly as such."242 
If the most striking effect of the severability clause is to 
deter litigation by making its futility clear in advance to potential 
challengers, then surely the clause should be vulnerable to a 
first amendment attack under the principles that emerge from 
the Court's "petition" cases. A recent decision of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit illustrates the applicability of 
these principles to legislative attempts to prescribe nullification 
of a benefit program in the event that the classifications on which 
it is based are held unconstitutional. 
Brookins v. 0'Bannon243 concerned a set of amendments to 
Pennsylvania's welfare program. The amendments were de­
signed to redistribute some assistance from all eligible recipients 
to a sub-class designated by the amendments as "chronically 
needy."244 The redistribution was accomplished by defining the 
remaining recipients as "transitionally needy"245 and limiting 
their eligibility for benefits to one ninety day period each year.246 
This new classification was accompanied by a five percent in­
crease in benefits to both "chronically" and "transitionally" 
needy families of three persons or more,247 with funding for the 
increase expected to come from savings attributable to the 
ninety day annual eligibility limitation for the "transitionally 
needy."248 A third provision made the grant of the five percent 
increase dependent on the constitutionality of the ninety day 
limitation, directing that "if the department is prevented by court 
order from implementing [the ninety day eligibility limitation], 
242 389 U.S. at 222. 
243 699 F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1983). 
244 Act 1982-75, § 10, 1982 Pa. Laws 231, 236-38, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 62, 
§ 432(3) (1982). 
245Id. 
246 /d. § lO(iii). 
247 Act 1982-75, § 20, 1982 Pa. Laws 231, 247, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 62, § 475 
(1982). 
248 Brookins v. O'Bannon, 699 F.2d at 650-51. 
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the provisions of this section shall be suspended and shall not 
take effect until [that limitation is] implemented."249 
The last of these provisions was challenged by an organi­
zation of Philadelphia welfare recipients whose membership in­
cluded both "chronically" and "transitionally" needy people 
under the new scheme. The Philadelphia Welfare Rights Organ­
ization (WRO) claimed that the conditional suspension of the 
increase detelTed the organization and its members from chal­
lenging the constitutionality of the ninety day eligibility limita­
tion in violation of their first amendment right to petition the 
courts for redress of grievances.250 Both the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the court of appeals 
acknowledged the protected status of the right, but held that it 
was not violated by the "conditional suspension" provision.25t 
For the court of appeals, the validity ofWRO's claim turned 
on whether either "chronically" or "transitionally" needy recip­
ients could fairly be said to be prevented or deterred from 
challenging the ninety day rule.252 As to the "chronically" needy, 
the answer was plainly no; since they were only benefited by 
the amendments, they would have no interest in challenging any 
of them, and thus could not be harmed by a provision which 
purportedly deterred such a challenge. 253 
With respect to the "transitionally" needy, the problem was 
somewhat more complex. The "transitionally" needy were, un­
like the "chronically" needy, plainly injured by the ninety day 
rule, and a successful constitutional challenge to the rule would 
nullify the five percent increase in benefits which they would 
otherwise enjoy. Nevertheless, the "transitionally" needy were 
not deterred from challenging the constitutionality of the ninety 
day limitation, because a successful outcome to their challenge 
would restore the status quo ante. The elimination of the rule 
would, despite suspension of the benefit increase, restore their 
eligibility for benefits on the same year-round basis enjoyed by 
249 Act 1982-75, § 20(b), 1982 Pa. Laws 231. 

250 Brookins v. O'Bannon, 699 F.2d at 651. 

251 Brookins v. O'Bannon, 550 F. Supp. 30, 32 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affd, 699 

F.2d 648, 652, 653-55 (3d Cir. 1983). 
252 Brookins v. O'Bannon, 699 F.2d at 653-54. 
253Id. 
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the "chronically" needy. The "transitionally" needy were not 
denied a remedy for the potentially unconstitutional injury in­
flicted on them by the amendments, and they were therefore 
not chilled in the exercise of their first amendment right to seek 
judicial review. 254 
Notwithstanding its failure to award relief, the Brookins 
court's analysis plainly supports the argument advanced here: 
A provision which deters litigation of a constitutional issue by 
denying relief to the challenging party violates the first amend­
ment. The Brookins result indicates that, iffaced with a remedial 
directive which in fact did forestall the award of any relief to 
the injured class, the court of appeals would strike the clause 
as a violation of the right of effective access to the courts. The 
Supreme Court was able to avoid addressing such a violation in 
Heckler v. Mathews because of its fiction that the injury inflicted 
by the pension offset severability clause is not the denial of 
Social Security benefits but the abstract imposition of sex-based 
stigmatization. 
IV. The Compatibility of Judicial Remedial Responsibility 
and Legislative Discretion 
This article argues that a very recent, unanimous, and seem­
ingly uncontroversial decision of the Supreme Court is com­
pletely wrong and potentially very dangerous. Such an argument 
must necessarily be received with caution, if not outright skep­
ticism, on pragmatic 'grounds alone. Still, if the argument is at 
all persuasive, it is because it fits accepted notions about the 
role of judicial review in our constitutional scheme, notions 
which were too easily passed over in Heckler v. Mathews. The 
proposition that statutes which preclude the award of a remedy 
for unconstitutionally inflicted injuries are themselves unconsti­
tutional is essential to the effective enforcement ofconstitutional 
limitations on government. If the argument is rejected-if leg­
islatures may, in advance of litigation, prevent persons harmed 
by an .unconstitutionally underinclusive classification from se­
curing any tangible relief from a successful challenge to that 
2S4 [d. at 654. 
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classification-the legislatures have a formidable weapon for 
fending off judicial scrutiny of the statutes they enact. 
The argument not only entails a wholesale rejection of 
Heckler v. Mathews, but also provides a limited modification of 
the well established tradition of judicial deference to legislative 
remedial choice in constitutional cases. It is fair to ask just how 
"limited" this modification is and what remains of the important 
legislative prerogative to specify the means for curing unconsti­
tutional underinclusiveness. 
The answer begins with a review of what the Supreme Court 
has done (as opposed to what it has said) when asked to exercise 
its inherent power either "to declare [an underinclusive statute] 
a nullity ... or ... extend the coverage of the statute to include 
those who are aggrieved by the exclusion."255 In choosing be­
tween these alternatives, the Court invariably has given effect 
to an identified legislative preference when that preference di­
rects that some form of relief be granted the aggrieved class 
(Welsh,256 Westcott257). In the absence of an identifiable legis­
lative preference, the Court has either provided relief tacitly by 
way of extension258 or has permitted lower courts to fashion a 
remedy following an adjudication of unconstitutionality (Orr v. 
Orr,259 Stanton v. Stanton,260 Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. 
CO. 261 ). The Court, however, has never fashioned or sustained 
a remedial directive which denies relief for the injury caused by 
an unconstitutionally underinclusive classification. On the con­
trary, even in cases which significantly predate Welsh, where 
the inherent judicial power either to extend or nullify was first 
255 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970)(HarIan, J., concurring 
in the result). 
256 [d. 
257 Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979). 
258 See cases cited supra note 16; see also Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 
310-12. 
259 440 U.S. 268,271-73 (1979). 
260 421 U.S. 7, 17-18 (1975) (remanding question whether parent's obli­
gation to support children of both sexes ends at age 18 or 21 for resolution by 
state courts). 
261 446 U.S. 142, 153 (1980) (remanding question whether to nullify work­
er's compensation dependency presumption or extend it to widowers for 
resolution by state court). See infra note 263. 
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articulated by Justice Harlan, the Court took pains to under­
score the fundamental premise that a person harmed by uncon­
stitutional government action is constitutionally entitled to a 
remedy for that harm.262 
Not even the result in Heckler v. Mathews stands against 
this history, for in Mathews the constitutionality of the under­
lying classification, the pension offset exception, was sustained. 
There was thus no unconstitutional government action and no 
occasion for the exercise of judicial remedial power. 
The Court's record in remedying unconstitutional underin­
clusiveness is therefore consistent with the argument advanced 
here, even if the language of its opinions is not.263 Moreover, 
262 Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931); 
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 314 (1940). 
263 The cases in which the court has discussed the effect to be given to 
severability clauses and/or the extension/nullification problem generally can 
be divided into two general groupings. The first consists of decisions in which 
the court has given effect to severability clauses which provide relief to the 
injured parties, or which otherwise preserve the remainder of a statutory 
scheme when a portion of it is held unconstitutional. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 
103 S. Ct. 2764, 2774-76 (1983)(finding unconstitutional one-house veto pro­
vision severable from general grant of authority of attorney general to suspend 
deportation of alien); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979)(discussed 
supra text accompanying notes 24-56); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09 
(1976)(per curiam opinion holding statutory provision for public financing of 
campaigns severable from unconstitutional limits on candidate campaign ex­
penditures); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585-86 (1968) (holding 
unconstitutional capital punishment clause severable from remainder of kid­
napping statute); McElroy v. United States ex reI. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 
283 (1960) (relying on statutory severability clause as basis for severing un­
constitutional authorization of court martial from remainder of statute); Wat­
son v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 395-97 (1941) (relying on severability clause to 
preserve parts of state antitrust statute which are complete in themselves even 
if other parts of statute are unconstitutional); Electric Bond & Share Co. v. 
SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 434 (1938)(relying on severability clause to sustain en­
forcement of constitutional provisions of Public Utility Act While reserving 
questions as to validity of other provisions of Act); Champlin Refining Co. v. 
Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932) (sustaining enforcement of 
constitutional state statute prohibiting waste of petroleum on ground that it 
was severable from arguably invalid accompanying price regulation statute). 
But see Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1922); Spraigue v. Thompson, 
118 U.S. 90, 95 (1886). See also supra note 148. 
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both the record and the argument leave ample room for legis­
lative remedial discretion. Most significantly, a legislature re­
tains the authority prospectively to abolish or otherwise alter a 
program of statutory benefits or burdens subsequent to a re­
viewing court's decision.264 Nothing in this argument, for ex­
ample, would preclude Congress from responding to a decision 
that the pension offset exception was unconstitutional by com­
pletely repealing it. Such a prospective repeal would neither 
interfere with a reviewing court's ability to grant relief to the 
litigants before it nor obstruct access to the litigation process 
by purporting to foreclose any remedy in advance of its 
commencement. 
Any legislative remedy prescribed in advance of litigation 
of the constitutional merits of an underinclusive classification 
must also be given effect so long as it vindicates the right of the 
class harmed to some form of constitutionally adequate relief. 
As noted in the discussion of constitutional remedies above,265 
this remedy need not be extension in the case of a benefit, or 
nullification in the case of a burden, although in many situations 
it may be difficult to fashion a constitutionally adequate alter-
The second category of decisions concerns underinclusive state statutory 
classifications in which remedial responsibility was remanded either to the 
state courts in which the case arose or to the state legislature. See, e.g., 
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152-53 (1980); Orr v. 
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282-83 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n. 24 
(1976)(authorizing state legislature to define cutoff age for purchase of 3.2 beer 
in gender-neutral fashion); Stanton v, Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17-18 (1975); 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (l942)(remanding issue of severability 
of unconstitutional exception for embezzlers from statute calling for steriliza­
tion of habitual criminals); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924) (re­
manding issue of severability of criminal sanctions imposed by state labor 
statute from invalid compulsory arbitration provision for resolution by state 
court); see also, Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344, 362-63 n.15 
(Harlan, J., concurring in result), in which Justice Harlan suggests that the 
Supreme Court enjoys wider discretion to extend federal than state law "even 
as a constitutional remedy." But see Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 
284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931), supra text accompanying notes 155-62. See also 
supra text accompanying notes 259-61. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 
12 at 312-14. 
264 See LaFrance, supra note 55, at 439. 
265 See supra text accompanying notes 193-95. 
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native. A reviewing court must assume affirmative remedial 
responsibility only if it cannot discern a preferred legislative 
remedy from the language and history of the statute, or if the 
preferred remedy is inadequate to relieve the injury inflicted by 
the classification. Under these circumstances the reviewing 
court must perform the traditional task of judicial review by 
granting relief to the aggrieved litigants before it.266 The alloca­
tion of remedial responsibility for constitutionally defective un­
derinclusiveness envisioned by this Article thus places only 
modest limits on the legislative role, limits which are essential 
to the effective operation of judicial review. 
The intrusion on legislative remedial discretion entailed by 
a decision to disregard a severability clause, such as the one at 
issue in Heckler v. Mathews, may, perhaps paradoxically, be 
more artificial than real. Although the legislative history is silent 
on this point, any member ofCongress who considered the likely 
impact of the clause would probably have seen (as we have) 
that its most immediate and predictable effect would be to stifle 
the incentive, and possibly the standing, of men denied benefits 
to challenge its constitutionality. Such a disincentive would thus 
work to ensure that the harsh remedial option envisioned by the 
severability clause, nullification of the exception, would never 
be invoked. 
These circumstances make it much more problematic to 
describe the severability clause as a reliable indication of Con­
gress's remedial intention in the event the exception were de­
clared unconstitutional.267 In a sense, the clause is purely hy­
pothetical, in contrast, for example, to a repeal of the exception 
enacted after adjudication of its unconstitutionality or a direc­
266 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932)(stating that "in cases 
brought to enforce constitutional rights, the judicial power of the United States 
necessarily extends to the independent determination of all questions, both of 
fact and law, necessary to the performance of that supreme function.") [d. 
267 Judge Guin's opinion in Mathews v. Heckler, invalidating the 1977 
Social Security Pension Offset Exception Severability Clause, suggests that 
he shares this skepticism. "The Court is convinced ... that the severability 
clause is not an expression of the true congressional intent, but instead is an 
adroit attempt to discourage the bringing of an action by destroying standing." 
1982 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1114,313, at 2408 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 1982), 
rev'd 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984). 
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tion that the constitutionality of the exception be ensured by 
extending the benefit it confers. Each of the latter prescriptions 
takes seriously the legislature's primary role as a dispenser of 
constitutional remedies. The offset severability clause, on the 
other hand, may quite plausibly be viewed as a legislative bluff. 
Bluffs of this sort should be called. The price, in terms of 
legislative prerogatives, is small, especially in light ofthe danger 
to the effective exercise of judicial review. 
A second paradoxical point raises a problem that may at 
first appear more threatening to the argument of this Article, 
but the contradiction it suggests can be resolved within the 
argument's terms. Throughout this discussion, it has been as­
sumed that only one class of potential litigants may seek to 
challenge an unconstitutionally underinclusive classification. 
This has been an easy assumption to posit, both because it helps 
illustrate the problems raised by complete judicial deference to 
legislative remedial choices, and because it matches the factual 
settings of Mathews, Westcott, and Welsh. Some underinclusive 
classifications, however, may well be challenged by two classes 
with interests directly opposed to one another. 
The alimony scheme at issue in Orr v. Orr268 provides one 
example. Although the requirement that men (and not women) 
pay alimony to their divorced spouses was in fact challenged by 
a male seeking relief from the obligation,269 the challenge could 
conceivably have come from an impecunious divorcing husband 
seeking an order requiring alimony payments from his wife. 
While the actual Orr petitioner could, as the Court pointed out, 
only benefit from nullification of all alimony obligations, the 
hypothetical challenger could just as obviously benefit only from 
the extension of the obligation to women. How can the interests 
of these two classes of men possibly be reconciled under the 
principle advanced here-that every person injured by an un­
constitutionally underinclusive statute has a right to a tangible 
remedy for that injury? 
Obvious they cannot, but this irreconcilability does not 
necessarily subvert the validity of the underlying principle. The 
268 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
269 [d. at 271. 
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resolution lies in the common understanding of the meaning of 
"tangible remedies" reflected in the opinions of both Justices 
Brennan and Rehnquist in the Orr case itself.270 Given the di­
rectly opposed interests of the two classes of men disfavored 
by the Orr classification, there is probably no sex-neutral (and 
thus constitutionally permissible) alimony scheme that would 
satisfy the interests of both of them.271 If so, it makes no sense 
to describe both of them as simultaneously entitled to a remedy 
for the injury inflicted by the unconstitutional underinclusive­
ness of the classification under challenge. Since as a matter of 
logic (rather than, as in the pension offset exception situation, 
a matter of legislative fiat) the disfavored classes cannot each 
benefit from a cure for the underinclusiveness, it is fair to de­
scribe the members of one or the other of the classes as pre­
senting no claim of entitlement to a constitutional remedy for 
the injury they have suffered. 
The distinction 'is not merely semantic. While courts can 
legitimately be asked to correct legislative failures to provide 
remedies for unconstitutionally inflicted injuries, neither courts 
nor legislatures can be expected to relieve disadvantages inher­
ent in the very logic of legislative classification. Even granting, 
however, that only one of two opposed classes disfavored by 
an underinclusive classification can secure tangible relief from 
the harm caused by the exclusion, it must be asked how a 
reviewing court should manage the remedial stage of litigation 
such as Orr v. Orr. To begin with, the court might be fortunate 
enough to find the very sort of severability clause that was 
improperly272 appended to the pension offset exception enacted 
by the Social Security Amendments of 1977. When attached to 
an underinclusive classification that disfavors two classes with 
opposite and irreconcilable interests, such a provision does not 
deny standing to a party suffering unconstitutional injury nor 
27°Id. at 268, 290. 
271 But see supra note 172. Justice Brennan's hypothesis that Mr. Orr 
might enjoy constitutionally sufficient, tangible relief even if alimony respon­
sibilities were imposed on divorcing wives would, if correct, show that Orr v. 
Orr does not present a situation of the sort described in the text. 440 U.S. at 
274 n.3. The discussion in the text assumes that this hypothesis is false. 
272 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. . 
148 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 20 
otherwise deter challenging litigation by purporting to forbid the 
court from granting a remedy for such injury. Instead, a clause 
which directs either extension or nullification in the event the 
classification is held unconstitutional simply makes a choice that 
is inevitable: it specifies which of two disfavored classes will 
receive relief from their injuries when only one can. 
In Orr, if the Alabama Legislature had, in advance of the 
litigation, specified the remedial intent ascribed to it by Justice 
Rehnquist-to extend the obligation to pay alimony to women 
in the event its imposition on men alone was held unconstitu­
tionaP73-the effect of such a specification would have been to 
preclude the reward of a remedy to Mr. Orr. Following the 
legislature's direction here, however, would not present the 
problems inherent in the severability clause at issue in Heckler 
v. Mathews. On the contrary, men denied the benefit of alimony 
by virtue of the legislature's failure to impose the corresponding 
burden on women would enjoy a clear, legislatively mandated 
remedy in the event a reviewing court found that failure uncon­
stitutional. More than this cannot be achieved from a system of 
judicial review. 
If the court is not lucky enough to find its remedial task 
anticipated by the legislature, its responsibility becomes less 
clear. It is free, of course, to do what the Justices tried to do in 
Westcott274 and Welsh,275 to search the deliberations of a legis­
lature that never considered the problem for evidence of a pre­
ferred remedy. For the reasons described in the above discus­
sion of the Court's efforts in those casesp6 the conclusions 
yielded by such an enterprise will seldom be convincing. A more 
straightforward alternative (which probably describes more ac­
curately what was actually done in Westcott and Welsh) would 
simply be to prescribe the remedy which seems more preferable 
on policy grounds. Among the more obvious factors a court 
273 In fact, on remand in Orr, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals effected 
just such an extension. Orr v. Orr, 374 So. 2d 895 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979), cert. 
denied 374 So. 2d 898 (Ala. 1979). 
274 Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89-93 (1979). 
m Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344, 363-67 (1970)(Harlan, J., 
concurring in result). 
276 See supra text accompanying notes 24-74. 
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might consider in determining whether it is better to extend the 
benefit or nullify the burden of a particular underinclusive clas­
sification are the size of the classes which would benefit from 
each choice (in most instances, the smaller the better), the 
relative cost of each alternative (to either public treasuries or 
private parties), and the extent to which either choice might 
threaten the ability of a class previously favored by the classi­
fication to meet the necessities of life.277 In Orr, for example, 
the first and third of these factors point fairly clearly toward 
extension of the alimony obligation to women (the option as­
sumed by Justice Rehnquist) rather than nullification of the 
burden imposed on men. 
A court which opts for candid acknowledgement of its law­
making role in fashioning the remedy for an unconstitutionally 
underinclusive statute may expect to encounter charges of im­
proper usurpation of legislative power. Such charges are easily 
deflected by the recollection that the ultimate remedy for leg­
islative underinclusion by definition remains with the enacting 
legislature. No part of the argument here requires a legislature 
to retain a program of benefits or burdens that it comes to 
disfavor in the wake of judicial correction of the program's 
underinclusiveness. A legislature has only the obligation to 
avoid intrusion on the corrective process.278 
2n See, e.g., Taxation with Representation v. Regan, 676 F. 2d 715, 742­
45 (D.C. Cir. 1982),rev'd on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983); see also 
supra note 181. For a general discussion of considerations relevant to the 
quasi-legislative policy choice between extension and nullification, see Gins­
burg, supra note 12, at 318-24 (recommending, in addition to the factors listed 
in the text, that a court consider whether the classification imposes a burden 
or confers a benefit, and the nature and extent of the impact of extension or 
nullification on persons not before the court). See also Note, Extension Versus 
Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial Alternative, 12 Colum. 
J.L. & Soc. Prob. 115 (1975). 
278 My choice of the problems presented by the Supreme Court's decision 
in Heckler v. Mathews to illustrate the issues addressed in the paper has 
pointed the discussion toward the responsibility of the federal courts to provide 
a remedy to persons injured by unconstitutionally underinclusive federal stat­
utes. The points made apply with equal force to underinclusive state statutes, 
regardless of whether the challenge to the underinclusiveness is heard by a 
federal or state court. The power and responsibility of the federal courts to 
provide equitable remedies to persons harmed by official enforcement of 
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Conclusion 
On its face, the standing decision in Heckler v. Mathews 
may seem unobjectionable. Justice Brennan's opinion for the 
Court applies two well established doctrinal lines of authority­
those pertaining to article III standing and to legislative remedial 
supremacy-in a straightforward, internally consistent manner 
to produce what may appear to be an enlightened result. Mter 
all, the opinion affirms the Mathews class' standing to challenge 
the Social Security pension offset exception and thus reinforces 
the Court's Willingness to entertain constitutional claims based 
on non-economic injuries. 
unconstitutional state statutes has a longer and, if anything, clearer history 
than does the analogous responsibility over federal officials. See, e.g., Ex 
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See also Sager, supra note 144, at 85 n. 
214. This power is limited only by considerations of comity, see, e.g., Younger 
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and by the eleventh amendment, see, e.g., 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), not at issue here. It is equally plain 
that the exercise of this power cannot, consistent with the supremacy clause, 
U.S. Const., art. VI, § 2, be obstructed by state statutes that would curtail 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts over constitutional claims. Thus, a federal 
court could not give effect to a state's attempt to withdraw standing to chal­
lenge state laws by precluding the award of any remedy for injuries from those 
laws. 
The obligation of state courts to enforce federal constitutional rights 
violated by the enforcement of state statutes or policies is equally long and 
well established. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). This obligation 
includes a duty to provide a constitutionally adequate remedy for injuries 
caused by the violation. See, e.g., Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 
284 U.S. 239 (1931); Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); General Oil 
Company v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908). The Supreme Court's decisions (in 
cases such as Wengler, Orr, Craig v. Boren, and Stanton) to remand the 
question of relief from unconstitutionally underinclusive state statutes for 
initial resolution by state courts (or legislatures) are in no way contrary to this 
proposition. If, on remand, the remedy afforded by the state were constitu­
tionally insufficient, Bennett teaches that the Supreme Court would direct that 
an adequate form of relief be provided. 284 U.S. at 247. See supra notes 153­
62, 200-02, 259-63 and accompanying text. Finally, it is axiomatic that the 
protection of access to the courts (whether state or federal) afforded by the 
first amendment is incorporated and made applicable to the states by the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 
314 U.S. 252 (1941); Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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This appearance, however, is highly deceptive. The prac­
tical impact of Heckler v. Mathews on the accessibility of judi­
cial review to unconstitutionally injured litigants is anything but 
expansive. The convergence of the Westcott principle of defer­
ence to legislative remedial choice with the requirement of a 
judicially remediable injury as a predicate to standing will, un­
less checked by the Supreme Court, permit both Congress and 
state legislatures279 to prevent judicial review of unconstitution­
ally underinclusive statutes through the device of inverse se­
verability clauses such as that in Mathews. Justice Brennan's 
response to this problem-to define the injury in Mathews as 
sex-based stigma-confuses the actual injury (denial of Social 
Security benefits) with the reason why that injury might be 
constitutionally impermissible. The result is approval of 
congressional power to withdraw all remedies for the actual 
injury. 
In the long run, our constitutional scheme cannot sustain 
such a sweeping grant of power to the legislative branch. The 
Mathews decision cuts against such basic principles as the right 
of persons injured by unconstitutional government conduct to 
an adequate remedy for that injury, the power of the federal 
courts to hear and adjudicate constitutional claims, and the first 
amendment right of litigants to petition the courts for redress of 
their grievances. Above all, the decision impairs the litigation 
process itself by advising those who would use it that their 
efforts will succeed only in harming others. 
Correction of the dangers presented by Heckler v. Mathews 
requires no radical alteration in the balance of remedial respon­
sibilities between legislatures and courts. The judicial respon­
sibility is limited to a single function, that of ensuring that an 
unconstitutionally injured litigant receives an adequate remedy 
for the harm actually suffered. In Heckler v. Mathews, Justice 
Brennan failed to recognize that the pension offset exception 
severability clause threatened this function. When faced with a 
similar severability clause in combination with an unconstitu­
tional underlying classification, it can only be hoped that the 
Court will reach a remedial result that is more consistent with 
our constitutional tradition. 
279 See supra note 278. 
